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ABSTRACT
THE VALUATION EFFECTS OF CORPORATE INVESTMENT DECISIONS:
EVIDENCE FROM DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PLANT ANNOUNCEMENTS.
Bum Suk Kim
Old Dominion University, 1996
Director: Dr. John Doukas

This study examines the effects of corporate investment decisions - announcements
o f plants - on the value of the firm, using event-study methodology. This paper consists
o f two parts. Essay I discusses the valuation effects of domestic investments, while Essay
II analyses the valuation effects o f foreign investments undertaken by U.S. firms and
compares the valuation effects between the two investments. Specifically, this study
examines the validity of the overinvestment hypothesis and whether focus-increasing
investments enhance the value o f the firm.
First, the evidence shows that the valuation effects of the investment decision depend
on the firm’s investment opportunities, proxied by Tobin’s q. That is, the domestic and
foreign plant announcements o f value-maximizing firms (i.e., q > 1) earn significant
positive abnormal returns, while those o f overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1) realize
significant negative abnormal returns. Also, for value-maximizing firms, the abnormal
returns are positively but insignificantly related to the level of cash flows, while, for
overinvesting firms, the abnormal returns are negatively related to the level of cash flows.
These results suggest that managers of overinvesting firms are more likely to waste cash
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flows in sub-optimal or negative net present value projects than managers of valuemaximizing firms. The evidence is consistent with the predictions of the overinvestment
hypothesis [Jensen (1986), Lang and Liztenberger (1989), Doukas (1995)].
Second, for both domestic and foreign investments, focus-increasing investments are
found to gain positive abnormal returns, whereas diversifying domestic and foreign
investments experience significant negative abnormal returns. Further, post-investment
performance tests show that firms with focus-increasing investments tend to improve their
profitability, while firms with diversifying investments do not. This evidence appear to
support the view [Lang and Stulz (1994)] that increases in corporate focus are consistent
with shareholder wealth maximization.
Overall, the results suggest that the valuation effects of corporate investment decisions
depend on the firm’s investment opportunities and the type o f investment decisions
pursued by the managers.
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The Valuation Effects of Corporate Investment Decisions:
Evidence From Domestic Plant Announcements

Essay I
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ABSTRACT

This study examines the stock market reaction to announcements of corporate
investment decisions by U.S. firms, using a sample of 194 domestic plant announcements
during the period of 1980-1992. The results show that value-maximizing firms gain
significant positive abnormal returns, while overinvesting firms experience significant
negative abnormal returns. Also, for overinvesting firms, there are significant agency costs
associated with managers’ discretion of free cash flows. The evidence supports
overinvestment hypothesis. This paper also finds that diversifying investments decrease
the value of the firm, while focus-increasing investments do not, implying that an increase
in corporate focus is consistent with shareholder wealth maximization.
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I. Introduction

Corporate managers are involved in acquisitions, R&D, and capital budgeting
investment decisions. Several researchers have studied the effects of acquisitions and
R&D expenditures on the market value of the firm.1 Even though firms have long
invested in plants, the effects of plant investment decisions on shareholder wealth have
received little attention relative to other investment decisions (i.e., acquisitions and R&D).
Shareholder wealth maximization hypothesis suggests that managers seek to maximize
shareholder wealth in corporate investment decisions. Thus, investment decision rule
states that managers should undertake only positive net present value (NPV) projects. In
contrast, Jensen’s (1986) overinvestment hypothesis suggests that, even though firms have
poor investment opportunities, managers with free cash flows2 tend to undertake suboptimal or negative NPV projects instead of distributing them to shareholders, resulting
in overinvestment and a reduction in firm value. This is because managers may feel that
their compensation, power, and job security are enhanced as firm size increases. However,
firms with profitable investment opportunities are more likely to use their internally
generated funds productively. Hence, the overinvestment hypothesis implies that the

1 See Travlos (1987), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988) for evidence
on acquisitions, Chan, Martin, and Kensinger (1990), Doukas and Switzer (1992) for evidence on
valuation effects o f R&D expenditures, and M cConnell and M uscarella (1985) for evidence on capital
budgeting decisions.
2 Jensen (1986) defines free cash flows as discretionary cash flows available to managers in excess of
that required to fund all positive projects.
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valuation effects of corporate investment decisions may depend on firm’s investment
opportunities. In addition, Jensen (1986) argues that corporate diversifying strategy (i.e.,
acquisition programs) is one way in which managers waste free cash flows, implying that
diversifying investments are likely to be value-decreasing activities.
McConnell and Muscarella (1985) find that announcements of unexpected increase
in company-wide capital expenditures are associated with positive market returns,3 while
announcements of unexpected decrease are associated with negative market returns. Their
findings are consistent with the market value maximization hypothesis. However, the
positive stock price reactions may stem from the fact that a sample of capital expenditure
increases is associated with either firms with good investment opportunities or focusincreasing investments. On the other hand, the negative stock price reactions may be
caused by the fact that a sample of capital expenditure decreases is associated with either
firms with poor investment opportunities or diversifying investments. However,
McConnell and Muscarella (1985) do not account for the effects of firm’s investment
opportunities and type o f investment on the value of the firm. Moreover, since their
sample consists of company-wide capital expenditures, it is difficult to draw parallel
conclusions on the valuation effects o f specific investment decisions such as plants.
Corporate investment decisions associated with acquisitions report that bidder returns
are often negative [Roll (1986), Dodd (1980), Malatesta (1983)].4 This evidence shows
that corporate investment decisions are not consistently associated with shareholder wealth

3 M cConnell and Muscarella (1985) exclude specific investment announcem ents (i.e., plant).
4 See Jensen and Ruback (1983) for review o f the literature on domestic acquisitions.
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maximization. Morck, Shliefer, and Vishny (1989) attribute the losses from acquisitions
to divergence o f interests between managers and shareholders with respect to corporate
investment decisions. Servaes (1991) and Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) examine
whether firm’s investment opportunities, measured by Tobin’s q, are important
determinants of gains from acquisitions. Servaes (1991) find that benefits of mergers are
larger when bidders are well-managed (i.e., q > 1). Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991)
document that bidders with high free cash flows and poor investment opportunities (i.e.,
q < 1) suffer significant negative returns for tender offers. This evidence appears to be
consistent with prediction of Jensen’s (1986) overinvestment hypothesis.
Several papers [Statman and Sepe (1989), Blackwell, Marr, and Spivey (1990),
Gombola and Tsetsekos (1992)] have examined the valuation effects of discontinuation
of investments and documented mixed market reactions. Statman and Sepe (1989) find
that, under the assumption o f investors’ knowledge o f losses from projects, capital
markets respond positively to such announcements. On the other hand, Blackwell, Marr,
and Spivey (1990), Gombola and Tsetsekos (1992) argue that negative abnormal returns
associated with plant closing announcements are caused by negative information about
firm’s investment opportunities.
Previous evidence on valuation effects o f acquisitions [Jensen and Ruback (1983)]
and plant closings [Statman and Sepe (1989), Blackwell, M arr and Spivey (1990),
Gombola and Tsetsekos (1992)] have provided mixed results. A possible explanation is
that the valuation effects of corporate investments depend on (1) firm’s investment
opportunities and (2) type of investment (i.e., focus-increasing and diversifying).
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However, these two factors have not been considered in the previous studies.
This paper attempts to provide new evidence on the valuation effects of corporate
investment decisions, using a sample of domestic plant announcements during the period
of 1980-1992. Specifically, two issues are addressed: (1) free cash flow/overinvestment
hypothesis and (2) type of investment (i.e., focus-increasing and diversifying).
First, this paper examines whether the valuation effects of corporate investment
decisions depend on firm’s investment opportunities.5 The sample is classified into firms
with profitable investment opportunities (i.e., value-maximizing) and firms with poor
investment opportunities (i.e., overinvesting). The overinvestment hypothesis predicts that,
for overinvesting firms, managers are likely to waste cash flows by undertaking negative
NPV projects, resulting in overinvestment and, hence, a reduction in the value of the firm.
Thus, plant investment announcements by overinvesting firms are expected to produce
negative abnormal returns. On the other hand, for value-maximizing firms, managers are
likely to spend cash flows on positive NPV projects, resulting in an increase of
shareholder wealth. Thus, plant investment announcements are not expected to cause
uniform valuation effects across firms.
The overinvestment hypothesis also implies that agency costs associated with the
discretion of free cash flows are expected to be greater for firms with poor investment
opportunities. Since investments by value-maximizing firms are expected to be positive
NPV projects, the stock price reactions are not likely to be related to free cash flows.
That is, agency costs associated with the discretion of free cash flows are expected to be

5 Lang and Litzenberger (1989) derive overinvestment hypothesis from free cash flow hypothesis to test
the valuation effects o f dividend changes.
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insignificant. However, since investments by overinvesting firms are expected to be
negative NPV projects, the stock market returns are likely to be negatively related to free
cash flows. This study provides cross-sectional evidence on relation between the firm’s
level of free cash flows and its stock price returns.
Second, this paper examines whether there are any differences in stock market returns
between focus-increasing and diversifying investments. Since the 1980s, empirical results
have been unfavorable to corporate diversification. Wemerfelt and Montgomery (1988)
document that firm performance, proxied by Tobin’s q, is positively related to an increase
in corporate focus. Morck, Shliefer, and Vishny (1990) show that unrelated acquisitions
in the 1980s did elicit negative effects on stock prices, while related acquisitions did not.
Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) report that unrelated acquisitions are more likely to be
value-decreasing activities than related acquisitions since the divestitures rate is higher for
unrelated acquisitions than related acquisitions. Lang and Stulz (1994) report that Tobin’q,
proxy for firm value, and the degree o f business diversification are negatively related
through the late 1970s and 1980s.6 John and Ofek (1995) find that an improvement in
corporate performance is associated with divestitures that increase firm’s business focus.7
Their study reports a positive relation between increase in corporate focus and change in
profitability of firms around investment announcements.

6 Lang and Stulz (1994) use T obin’s q as the measure of performance instead o f the measurement
problem of accounting perform ance measures since the use of Tobin’s q does not require a risk
adjustment or normalization to compare Tobin’s q across firms, in contrast to comparison of stock
return or accounting perform ance measures.
7 John, Lang, and Netter (1992) report that one o f the reasons for firm ’s negative earnings is
overinvestment. In their study, increasing focus is common strategy o f firms coping with performance
declines.
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Even though evidence on the valuation effects of corporate diversification are
provided in the context of corporate acquisitions or divestitures, there is little evidence
on the impact of focus-increasing and diversifying plant investments on the value of the
firm. To examine whether focus-increasing investments are more highly valued than
diversifying investments, the sample is divided into focus-increasing and diversifying
corporate investments. If diversifying investments are one way in which managers waste
cash flows for their own benefit at the expense o f shareholders [Jensen (1986)], or if an
increase in corporate focus enhances managerial efficiency [John and Ofek (1995)], it is
expected that focus-increasing (diversifying) investments realize positive (negative) stock
returns. Further, whether the extent o f abnormal returns associated with the type of
investment depends on firm’s investment opportunities is analyzed. This study also
compares pre- and post-performance between focus-increasing and diversifying
investments. Finally, the relation between changes in performance and changes in
corporate focus is reported.
In general, the results are consistent with the predictions o f the overinvestment
hypothesis. Value-maximizing firms gain significant positive stock market returns for
plant investments, while overinvesting firms experience significant negative abnormal
returns. Also, the stock market returns are negatively related to the free cash flows of
overinvesting firms and unrelated to the free cash flows o f value-maximizing firms. The
evidence also shows that focus-increasing investments earn positive abnormal returns,
while diversifying investments suffer significant negative abnormal returns, implying that
increase in corporate focus is associated with market value maximization [Lang and Stulz
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(1994), John and Ofek (1995)]. Firms with focus-increasing investments improve their
performance after investments, whereas firms with diversifying investments do not. Also,
the changes in performance are positively related to increase in corporate focus. Overall
evidence shows that firm’s investment opportunities and the type of investment are
important determinants of corporate investment gains.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the previous literature on
capital expenditures decisions and the relation between the market value of the firm and
corporate diversification. The two main issues - overinvestment hypothesis and valuation
effects of type o f investment - are discussed in section IE. Section IV describes data and
methodology. In section V, empirical evidence is presented. Section VI has concluding
remarks.

II. Literature Review

A. The Domestic Capital Investment Decision

Empirical research into corporate investment decisions has been based on the
assumption that managers undertake only positive net present value (NPV) projects to
maximize shareholder wealth [McConnell and Muscarella (1985)]. Accordingly, all
corporate investments are expected to increase the market value of the firm. However,
empirical evidence is not consistent with market value maximization hypothesis [Dodd
(1980), Malatesta (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983)].
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Jensen (1986) argues that managers with substantial free cash flows have a tendency
to overinvest by undertaking negative NPV projects. It implies that there are agency costs
between managers and shareholders with respect to the use of free cash flows. That is,
managers may spend cash flows for their own benefit at the expense of shareholders.
According to the overinvestment hypothesis, firms with poor investment opportunities
(i.e., overinvesting firms) are likely to waste cash flows by undertaking negative NPV
projects. On the other hand, firms with profitable investment opportunities (i.e., valuemaximizing firms) are likely to spend cash flows on positive NPV projects. Thus, the
valuation effects of corporate investment decisions may depend on firm’s investment
opportunities. The overinvestment hypothesis predicts that investment increases by valuemaximizing (overinvesting) firms would enhance (reduce) the value of the firm.
In contrast to Jensen (1986), McConnell and Muscarella (1985) assume no agency
costs concerning corporate capital expenditure decisions. In a sample of 658 capital
expenditure announcements during the period of 1975-1981, they find that announcements
o f unexpected increases (decreases) in planned capital expenditure are associated with
significant positive (negative) abnormal stock returns.8 However, the positive (negative)
stock market returns may be driven by the fact that in their sample value-maximizing
firms were overrepresented. McConnell and Muscarella (1985) do not account for the
valuation effects o f firm’s investment opportunities. In addition, since their sample
consists of only company-wide capital expenditure announcements, their study does not
provide evidence on specific investment decisions such as plants. Thus, it is difficult to

8 The exception is that, for a sample o f exploration and development, an increase in budgets exhibits
negative stock returns, while a decrease in budgets realizes negative stock returns.
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draw parallel conclusions for the valuation effects of plant investments.
Empirical evidence on acquisitions shows that bidding firms, on average, do not gain
positive abnormal returns [Dodd (1980), Malatesta (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983)].
Meanwhile, using firm’s investment opportunities measured by Tobin’s q, Servaes (1991)
and Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) present evidence on valuation effects of
acquisitions. Servaes (1991) reports, in a sample of 704 mergers and tender offers over
the period of 1972-1987, that well-managed firms (i.e., q > 1) have larger gains than
poorly-managed firms (i.e., q < 1). Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) examine a sample
of 101 tender offers over the 1980-1986 period. The their results show that acquiring
firms with low q (i.e., q < 1) and high free cash flows gain the lowest abnormal returns,
while those with high q (i.e., q > 1) and low free cash flows experience the largest
abnormal returns. This evidence seems to support the overinvestment hypothesis.
The valuation effects of discontinuation o f investments have provided mixed results.
In a sample of 111 project termination announcements over the 1969-1983 period,
Statman and Sepe (1989) find positive stock market reactions to project termination
announcements. Given investor’s knowledge of losses, firm’s willingness to reduce valuedecreasing activities is associated with positive impacts on the value of the firm. On the
other hand, Blackwell, Marr, and Spivey (1990) and Gombola and Tsetsekos (1992) find
negative stock returns to the announcements of plant closing decisions.9 The authors
suggest that, under information asymmetry of profitability of plants between managers and

9 Blackwell, Marr, and Spivey (1990) use a sample o f 286 plant closing announcements from 1980
through 1984. In Gombola and Tsetsekos (1992), a sample o f 283 plant closing announcements during
the period o f 1980-1986 is examined.
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investors, negative abnormal returns may be caused by negative information about firm’s
investment opportunities.
Previous empirical tests o f corporate investments [Jensen and Ruback (1983), Statman
and Sepe (1989), Blackwell, Marr, and Spivey (1990)] have yielded inconclusive results.
In the previous studies, firm’s investment opportunities have not been considered as a
determinant of the valuation effects of corporate investment decisions. This study
examines whether the firm 's investment opportunities are associated with the valuation
effects of corporate investment decisions.

B. Types of Investment Decisions

The valuation effects associated with the type of investment (i.e.. focus-increasing and
diversifying) have been only examined in the context of divestitures and acquisitions.
Porter (1987) reports that, in a sample of thirty-three U.S. companies during the
period of 1950-1986, acquisitions have an average divestment rate o f 60%.10 However,
since firms may divest for reasons other than performance declines, divestiture rates may
not be interpretec- as unambiguous measures of failure [Weston (1989)].“
Wemerfelt and Montgomery (1988) find that firm performance, proxied by Tobin’s

10 Porter (1986) tracks acquisitions made over 1950-1986. The success ratio o f diversification as the
number o f units retained after the acquisition by the firm is measured.
11 W arding-off takeover, changing strategies, and government requirements are suggested as motives
for divestiture activities [Weston (1989)].
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q, is positively related to an increase in corporate focus.12 They interpret this evidence
as less focused firms are less efficient to transfer their competitive edges to different
markets than more focused firms. However, since their study is based on only one-year
period (i.e., 1976), it may be difficult to draw general conclusions.
Studies about acquisitions have produced evidence in favor of focus-increasing
investments. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) find that, in a sample o f 326 U.S.
acquisitions between 1975 and 1987, bidders realize positive abnormal returns for related
acquisitions, whereas bidders experience negative abnormal returns for unrelated
acquisitions. In a sample of 282 acquisitions over 1971-1982, Kaplan and Weisbach
(1992) document that about 60% o f diversifying acquisitions are divested. In contrast,
fewer than 20% of related acquisitions are divested. The authors interpret this evidence
in support of the view that corporate diversification is a value-decreasing investment.
Lang and Stulz (1994) find a negative relation between Tobin’s q, proxy for firm
performance, and the degree o f diversification.13 In their study, Tobin’s q is negatively
correlated with the number of business segments and positively correlated with the mean
and median of Herfindahl index. The evidence also shows that mean and median Tobin’s
q of diversifying firms are lower for focus-increasing firms, implying that capital markets
value focus-increasing firms more highly than diversifying firms. However, their

12 W em erfelt and Montgomery (1988), in their model, regress Tobin’s q on focus, industry, and market
share variables. They do not report estim ates o f regression coefficients but contribution o f these
variables to the adjusted R2 o f a regression.
13 Lang and Stulz (1994) discuss the problem o f comparing the average returns o f diversified firms with
that o f specialized firms. They use chop-shop approach [Lebaron and Speidell (1987)] in which the
q ’s o f diversified firms is the q these firm s would have if stand-alone q o f each segment were the
average q o f the single-segment firm in its industry.
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classification scheme is different from that used in this study.14
Using a sample o f 321 divestitures by U.S. firms during the period of 1986-1988,
John and Ofek (1995) test whether an increase in corporate focus is consistent with
shareholder wealth maximization.15 Using several accounting measures of performance,
their study documents that firms that increase focus by divestitures improve their
performance after divestitures, while firms that increase diversification do not.16 They
argue that it may occur because sales of assets unrelated to core-business increase the
efficient use of corporate resources. In addition, cross-sectional analysis shows a
significant positive relationship between increases in corporate focus17 and a corporate
post-divestiture performance.
Using several focus measures,18 Comment and Jarrell (1995) show a trend toward
increase in corporate focus across exchange-listed firms during the period of 1978-1989.
In their study, changes in number o f business segments and Herfindahl index over the
sample period are estimated as a measure o f change in degree o f diversification. In
addition, they document that focus-increasing firms have larger abnormal returns than

14 In Lang and Stulz (1994), firms that change the number o f business segments from one to two or
more in the sam ple period o f 1978-1990 are classified as diversifying firms and firms that reduce
segm ents from five or more to four or less are classified as focus-increasing firms.
15 They restrict their sam ple only to the divestiture o f operating units, excluding the partial divestitures
or sell-offs o f non-operating assets such as real estate.
16 Three measures o f profitability are (1) earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (EBITD) to
sales, (2) EBITD to book value o f assets, and (3) EBITD to market value o f equity.
17 Dummy variable equals zero if the divested segment’s main 4-digit SIC code is the same as the
seller’s main 4-digit SIC code, and one otherwise.
18 Com m ent and Jarrell (1995) calculate focus measures such as the number o f four-digit SIC codes
assigned by COM PUSTAT and a revenue-based Herfindahl index.
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diversifying firms.19 Instead of using an event study, authors estimate the cumulative
abnormal returns over the year of the changes in focus and the preceding year. However,
this approach could not identify the market reactions to investment announcements.
Using business segment-based data, Berger and Ofek (1995) develop the industrial
multiplier approach and compare the sum of the imputed stand-alone values of the
segments of diversified firms to the actual values o f those firms.20 Values of diversified
firms are estimated to be 13% to 15% below the sum of the imputed values of their
segments, implying that corporate diversification decreases the firm value. The focus in
Berger and Ofek (1995) is on the relation between the level o f degree of diversification
and firm value, whereas focus in this study is on the effects of the changes in the degree
of diversification on the value of the firm.
Previous studies on the effects of corporate diversification, generally, support the view
that diversification hurts shareholder wealth. However, there is no evidence, to our
knowledge, that examines directly the valuation effects of focus-increasing and
diversifying investment decisions.

19 Comment and Jarrell (1995) classify a sample o f firms according to the direction o f the change in
focus as measured by the revenue-based Herfindahl index - 1) focus increase, 2) no change, and 3)
focus decrease.
20 Berger and Ofek (1995) use the industrial multiplier approach in which they measure the percentage
difference between a firm 's total value and the sum of imputed values for its segments as stand-alone
entities. They compare the sum of the imputed stand-alone values o f the segments o f diversified
companies to the actual values of those companies. The natural log o f the ratio o f firm’s actual value
to its imputed value is a measure o f the gain or loss in value from diversification. Positive excess
returns indicate that diversification increases the value o f segments beyond that o f their stand-alone
counterparts. Negative excess returns indicate that diversification reduces value.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

14

III. Valuation Effects of Corporate Investment Decisions

A. Overinvestment Hypothesis

A traditional investment decision rule states that managers should undertake only
positive NPV projects. That is, if the discounted value of expected cash flows from plant
investment is positive, the decision to undertake such an investment would increase the
value of the firm. Thus, announcements of an increase (decrease) in investments are
expected to have positive (negative) stock market returns [McConnell and Muscarella
(1985)].
Agency costs between managers and shareholders are discussed by Jensen and
Meckling (1976). Unless managers are constrained by monitoring or bonding, they would
make corporate decisions that increase their own utility. Jensen (1986) argues that there
are agency costs associated with the distribution of free cash flows. That is, managers
with high free cash flows have a tendency to overinvest by undertaking negative NPV
projects instead o f distributing free cash flows to shareholders.21 Jensen’s (1986)
overinvestment hypothesis predicts that firms with poor investment opportunities are more
likely to waste cash flows by engaging in sub-optimal or negative NPV projects, resulting
in overinvestment and a reduction of the value of the firm. On the other hand, firms with
profitable investment opportunities are more likely to use cash flows in positive NPV

21 Evidence in favor o f free cash flows/overinvestment hypothesis is presented by Pilotte (1992) for
security offering announcement, Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) for tender offers, and Lehn and
Poulsen (1989) for going private transactions.
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projects, leading to shareholder wealth maximization. Thus, the overinvestment hypothesis
implies that the valuation effects o f corporate investment decisions depend on firm’s
investment opportunities.
This paper tests the overinvestment hypothesis by analyzing the impact of corporate
investment decisions on the value of the firm. Testing the overinvestment hypothesis
requires knowledge of firm’s investment opportunities. This paper uses Tobin’s q to
distinguish value-maximizing (i.e., q > 1) from overinvesting (i.e., q < 1) firms.22
According to the overinvestment hypothesis, investment announcements by valuemaximizing firms are expected to generate positive market returns, while investment
announcements by overinvesting firms are expected to produce negative market returns.
The overinvestment hypothesis also implies that the free cash flow available to
managements is an important determinant to explain the abnormal returns for investments.
That is, since overinvesting firms are expected to waste free cash flows in sub-optimal
or negative NPV projects, free cash flows might increase agency costs between managers
and shareholders, implying a negative relation between the level of cash flows and
abnormal market returns. On the other hand, since value-maximizing firms are likely to
spend free cash flows on value-increasing investments, no relation between the level of
free cash flows and abnormal market returns is expected. To examine this implication,
this study analyzes the cross-sectional relation between stock market returns and free cash
flows for value-maximizing and overinvesting firms, respectively.
To further examine the extent o f abnormal returns associated with free cash flows and

52 See Lang and Litzenberger (1989) for the use o f T obin’s q as an indicator o f overinvestment.
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firm’s investment opportunities, the sample is divided into four subsamples according to
firm’s investment opportunities and level o f free cash flows: (1) value-maximizing firms
with high free cash flows, (2) value-maximizing firms with low free cash flows, (3)
overinvesting firms with high free cash flows, and (4) overinvesting firms with low free
cash flows. According to the overinvestment hypothesis, investment announcements by
overinvesting firms with high free cash flows are expected to yield the lowest abnormal
returns since these firms are more likely to have the highest agency costs and undertake
negative NPV projects. Value-maximizing firms are expected to earn positive abnormal
returns regardless of the level o f free cash flows since these firms are expected to use
cash flows in positive NPV investments.

B. Type of Investment Decisions

This section examines whether the type of investment (i.e., focus-increasing and
diversifying) has any differential effects on the value of the firm. The potential benefits
associated with corporate diversification include: (1) greater operating efficiency,23 (2)
less incentive to pass up positive NPV projects,24 and (3) greater debt capacity and lower
taxes.25 The potential costs include: (1) the use of increased discretionary resources to

23 Chandler (1977) argues that, diversified firms are more efficient and profitable than their line o f
business would be separately since diversified firms have better coordination than focused firms.
24 W eston (1989) states that diversified firms have large internal capital markets so that they make more
positive NPV investments than focused firms.
25 Lewellen (1971), M ajd and M yers (1987) argue that diversified firms are predicted to have more tax
advantage than focused firms since diversified firms have greater debt capacity.
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undertake value-decreasing investments, (2) information asymmetry costs between central
and divisional managers,26 (3) cross-subsidies that allow poor segments to drain
resources from better performing segments, and (4) misalignments of incentives between
core business and non-core business.27 However, the overall valuation effects of
corporate diversification are not clear.
Some studies about corporate diversification through acquisitions have explained the
valuation effects in the context of agency problems [Jensen (1986), Morck, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1988), Shleifer and Vishny (1989)]. Agency theory of acquisitions states that
diversification is undertaken for reasons other than market value maximization. Managers’
incentives to invest in unrelated business to the firm’s core business may be motivated
by managers’ objectives to reduce employment risk.28 Jensen (1986) argues that
managers with free cash flows are more likely to undertake value-decreasing investments
(i.e., diversification programs29) instead o f paying them out to shareholders. Morck,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) suggest that managers tend to overinvest beyond the valuemaximizing level and pursue value-decreasing diversifying investments for their own
benefits at the expense of shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Morck, Shleifer, and

26 Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv (1982) suggest that information asymmetry costs are higher in diversified
firms than in focused firms, resulting in a reduction o f value o f the firm than their lines o f business
would be separately.
27 M yer, Milgrom, and Roberts (1992) argue that unprofitable lines o f business create greater value
losses in conglomerates than they would as stand-alone firms.
28 Amihud and Lev (1981) argue that managers have incentive to reduce their employment risk.
29 The increase in oil price generated large cash flows in the oil industry in the late 1970s and early
1980s. However, oil industry managers did not pay out the free cash flow to shareholders. Instead,
they launched diversification programs to invest funds outside the industry (e.g. Montgomery Ward
by Mobil Corp., Reliance Electric by Exxon). These acquisitions turned out to be unsuccessful.
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Morck (1990) argue that managers can entrench themselves by making manager-specific
investments, implying that corporate diversification activities are not consistent with
shareholder wealth maximization. That is, managers may attempt to diversify due to
firm’s poor financial performance relative to other firms in the same industry. Such
diversified investments may make it costly for shareholders to replace existing
management.
The issue of diversification effects has been also studied by examining the relation
between change in degree of diversification and the change in firm value, using a sample
of divestitures of non-core-business assets. The rationale of divestitures is that firms could
be better managed and achieve greater profits if firms concentrate on their core
businesses. In the 1960s and 1970s, there were trends toward diversification into unrelated
business. However, since 1980s, this trend has been reversed [Comment and Jarrell
(1995)]. This phenomenon is interpreted as evidence supporting the view that
diversification is not consistent with shareholder wealth maximization [Berger and Ofek
(1995), Comment and Jarrell (1995)]. John and Ofek (1995) find that sales of assets
unrelated to the core-business lead to an improvement in the operating performance of the
seller’s remaining assets due to an increase in operational efficiency. Stock returns for
asset-sale announcements are also greater for focus-increasing divestitures than focusdecreasing divestitures, supporting the view that firms could increase shareholder wealth
by focusing on its primary business.
Lang and Stulz (1994) find a negative relation between Tobin’s q and the degree of
diversification, suggesting that the capital markets value focus-increasing firms more than
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diversifying firms. It may be because focus-increasing firms might have a competitive
advantage in core-business activities, while diversifying firms might not have such an
advantage.
The previous studies about divestitures [Porter (1987), Comment and Jarrell (1995),
John and Ofek (1995)] and acquisitions [Morck, Shliefer, and Vishny (1989)] provide
evidence against diversification. Porter (1987), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) use
divestitures rates as an evidence of the failure of diversifying investments. However,
divestiture ratios may be subject to measurement problems [Weston (1989)]. In Comment
and Jarrell (1995) and Berger and Ofek (1995) study, changes in either the number of
segments or Herfindahl index are estimated to measure the degree of corporate
diversification, instead of comparing the SIC digit code of new investment with that of
firm’s primary business. Lang and Stulz (1994) and Wemerfelt and Montgomery (1988)
examine the cross-sectional relation between the degree of diveisification and firm value.
Furthermore, divestitures announcements may realize positive market reactions since the
capital markets interpret that firms correct previous bad investment decisions. However,
it is unclear whether diversifying investments become value-decreasing even though the
investments have once been profitable30 or whether managers undertake diversifying
investments for the reasons other than shareholder wealth maximization even though they
are value-decreasing. Given these previous studies, it is difficult to draw parallel
conclusions concerning the valuation effects of specific corporate investments.

30 Weston (1989) argues that firms may sell a business it has improved or a business that once had
synergies with the firm’s core business but no longer does. In this case, original investments could
have been increased shareholder value.
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This paper provides direct evidence on the valuation effects o f focus-increasing and
diversifying investments, using a sample of plant investment announcements. The sample
is classified into focus-increasing and diversifying investments. If diversifying investment
is one way in which managers waste cash flows for their own benefit at the expense of
shareholders [Jensen (1986), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989)], or if an increase in
corporate focus enhances managerial efficiency, it is expected that focus-increasing
investments gain positive stock returns, while diversifying investments exhibit negative
abnormal returns.
To further examine whether the extent of the abnormal returns associated with type
o f investment may differ significantly for value-maximizing and overinvesting firms, the
sample is classified into four subsamples according to firm’s managerial characteristics
and type of investment: (1) value-maximizing firms with focus-increasing investments,
(2) value-maximizing firms with diversifying investments, (3) overinvesting firms with
focus-increasing investments, and (4) overinvesting firms with diversifying investments.
Focus-increasing investment announcements by value-maximizing firms are expected to
gain the largest abnormal returns, since these investments are likely to be more valueincreasing activities. On the other hand, diversifying investment announcements by
overinvesting firms are expected to experience the lowest abnormal returns, since these
investments are likely to be more value-decreasing activities.
Furthermore, Lang and Stulz (1994) argue that firms which have limited investment
opportunities in their core-business are likely to engage in diversifying investment
transactions. However, such firms may lack the required competitive edge in non-core
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business and thus lose from diversification. Consistent with Lang and Stulz (1994), John
and Ofek (1995) report that focus-increasing asset-sales are associated with an
improvement in firm performance, while diversifying asset-sales are not.

IV. D ata & M ethodology

A. D ata

The sample o f this essay I consists of domestic plant announcements during the
period of 1980-1992.31 The sample is collected from the annual edition of the Wall
Street Journal Index. Once the announcement dates are identified, other relevant
information is obtained from the articles reported in the Wall Street Journal.
The sample is collected based on the following criteria: (1) firms should be U.S.
manufacturing companies, (2) firms should be listed on NYSE or AMEX, and (3) CRSP
and COMPUSTAT tapes are available for the firms. Firms announcing purchase of
equipment or machinery, capital budgeting, and purchase o f plant from other companies
are excluded. Also excluded are firms with other corporate announcements around 15
days of plant announcement. This screening procedure produces a sample of 194

31 For example,
Eastman Kodak plans to build a $50 million plant in suburban Gates, N.Y. to manufacture
Ektaprint copier-duplicator and parts (WSJ Jan. 07, 1981).
Union Camp will build a $600 million bleached pulp and paper mill near Eastover, S.C.
(W SJ M ay 20, 1981).
Armco will build a $50 million steel-coating facility at its Middleton, Ohio (W SJ Oct. 03, 1984).
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investment announcements.
The sample is divided into value-maximizing and overinvesting firms, using Tobin’s
q. If a firm has q > 1 (sample size = 61), it is classified as value-maximizing. Otherwise,
firms with q < 1 are classified as overinvesting (sample size = 133). The sample is also
classified into high and low free cash flow firms. Lehn and Poulsen (1989) define free
cash flows as operating income before depreciation minus interest expense, taxes,
preferred dividends, and common dividends. In this study, the value of normalized free
cash flows is used as in Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991). Lang and Litzenberger (1991)
normalize free cash flows by dividing them by the book value o f the total assets since
large firms are more likely to have higher cash flows. If free cash flows of a firm are
larger (smaller) than the sample median, it is classified as high (low) free cash flow firm.
The sample is also divided into firms with focus-increasing investments (sample size
= 129) and firms with diversifying investments (sample size = 59). An investment is
classified as a focus-increasing investment if the 2-digit SIC code of the investment is the
same as the firm’s main 2-digit code (i.e., firm’s core-business). Otherwise, it is classified
as a diversifying investment.32
The frequency distribution o f the sample o f domestic investment announcements by
year during the period o f 1980-1992 is presented in Table 1-1. The 194 announcements
are made by 152 different U.S. firms.

32 The Herfindahl index, defined as the sum o f segm ents’sales squared divided by total sales squared,
has been used as alternative measure to classify investments into focus-increasing and diversifying
investment.
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[ Insert Table 1-1 about here]

Table 1-2 shows the frequency distribution of domestic investment announcements,
classified by the 2-digit SIC industrial code.

[ Insert Table 1-2 about here]

Most domestic investment announcements occurred in the following industries: paper
and allied products, chemical and allied products; primary metals; industrial machinery
and equipment; motor vehicles and car bodies or transportation equipments. However,
domestic investment activity represents a relatively broad spectrum of industries.
Table 1-3 reports summary statistics of the sample o f firms with domestic
investments,33 including Tobin’s q, free cash flow, ratio of debt to total assets, ratio of
R&D to sales, ratio of advertising expenditure to sales, insider ownership (i.e., proportion
of outstanding shares held by insiders), ratio o f foreign sales to total sales, size of
investment, and firm size. Panel A shows the summary statistics for the entire sample.
Panel B provides the summary statistics for the sample of the value-maximizing firms
(i.e., q > 1) and panel C reports the summary statistics for overinvesting firms (i.e., q <

1).

33 The data for estimation o f Tobin’s q and firm size are collected from Compustat. Insider ownership,
ratio o f foreign sales to total sales are obtained from Value Line Investm ent Survey. Sizes of
investment are obtained from the article reported in the Wall Street Journal.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

24
Table 1-1

Frequency Distribution of the Domestic Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms:
1980-1992
Year

Frequency

1980

30

1981

23

1982

22

1983

14

1984

19

1985

10

1986

5

1987

12

1988

12

1989

12

1990

10

1991

9

1992

16

Total

194
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T a b le 1-2

Frequency Distribution of the Domestic Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms, Classified
by Industry (2-digit SIC code): 1980-1992
2-digit
SIC Code

Industry Group

Frequency

13

Oil and gas exploration

20

Food and kindred products

22

Textile mill products

1

23

Apparel and other finished goods

2

24

Lumber and wood products

5

26

Paper and allied products

27

Printing and publishing

28

Chemicals and allied products

50

29

Petroleum refining

11

30

Rubber and plastic products

9

32

Stone, clay, and glass products

7

33

Primary metals

34

Fabricated metal products

3

35

Indust machinery & computer equip.

16

36

Electronic equipment

4

37

Transportation equipment

22

38

Measuring instr., photography, watches

9

48

Communication

1

59

Miscellaneous retail

1

78

Motion pictures

1

1
10

19
1

21

194
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[ Insert Table 1-3 about here]

It is evident that value-maximizing firms have a higher mean ratio of R&D to sales
than overinvesting firms, suggesting that value-maximizing firms have more growth
opportunities than overinvesting firms. Value-maximizing firms, on average, have a lower
proportion of shares held by insiders than overinvesting firms, implying that valuemaximizing firms are widely owned than overinvesting firms. Value-maximizing firms
appear to have a higher mean ratio of foreign sales to total sales than overinvesting firms.
The average size o f the plant investment is larger for overinvesting firms ($152 million)
than for value-maximizing firms ($88 million). In terms of market capitalization, valuemaximizing firms are, on average, larger than overinvesting firms.

B. Methodology

a. Estimation of Tobin’s q

Tobin’s q, defined as the ratio of the market value o f the firm to the replacement cost
of its assets, has been used to explain cross-sectional differences in investment
opportunities and management performance across firms.34 For example, Tobin’s q is
used as measure of management performance [Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989),

34 For example, the relationship between managerial equity ownership and firm value [Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1988), M cConnell and Servaes (1990)], the relationship between managerial performance
and tender offer gains [Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989)].
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Table 1-3
Summary Statistics For Firms with the Domestic Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms:
1980-1992
N

Mean

Std. dev

Minimum Maximum

Panel A: Entire sample
Tobin’s q
Free cash flow/total assets1
Debt/total assets
R&D/sales
Advertising/sales
Insider ownership2
Foreign sales/total sales
Size of investment ($ million)
Firm Size ($ million)

194
0.8562
0.5253
194
0.1419
0.0962
194
0.2275
0.1561
159
0.0341
0.0529
101
0.0301
0.0338
156
0.0678
0.1086
142
0.3035
0.1551
121 130.4900 217.4000
194 5687.6800 9583.9700

0.2430
-0.0329
0.0037
0.0010
0.0002
0.0500
0.0000
5.0000
108.9400

4.1250
1.1320
1.5379
0.6050
0.2232
0.5000
0.7500
1500.0000
57981.9800

B. High q firms3
61
Tobin’s q
Free cash flow/total assets
61
61
Debt/total assets
47
R&D/sales
41
Advertising/sales
Insider ownership
48
Foreign sales/total sales
45
Size of investment ($ million) 41
61
Firm Size ($ million)

1.4264
0.5737
0.1644
0.1422
0.2208
0.2123
0.0603
0.0881
0.0473
0.0448
4.8604
7.8135
34.9330
13.8480
88.1720 104.8700
6660.5200 9863.4200

1.0000
0.0149
0.0037
0.0033
0.0046
0.0500
0.0600
7.3000
227.9200

4.1250
1.1320
1.5379
0.6050
0.2232
0.4000
0.6000
600.0000
57981.5800

C. Low q firms
Tobin’s q
133
Free cash flow/total sales
133
Debt/total assets
133
112
R&D/sales
Advertising/sales
60
Insider ownership
108
Foreign sales/total sales
97
Size o f investment ($ million) 80
Firm size ($ million)
133

0.5948
0.1867
0.1315
0.0632
0.2306
0.1230
0.0231
0.0189
0.1849
0.0154
7.6472
11.9080
28.2260
15.8500
152.1700 254.5900
5241.4900 9457.2800

0.2430
-0.0329
0.0125
0.0010
0.0002
0.0500
0.0000
5.0000
108.9400

0.9750
0.3624
0.6598
0.1066
0.0753
0.5000
0.7500
1500.0000
56703.4600

1The free cash flow is defined as in Lehn and Poulsen (1989) (i.e. operating income before depreciation minus
interest expense, taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends).
1 It is defined as the percent of outstanding shares held by insiders. The data are collected from several issues
of the Value Line Investment Survey.
3 High flow) q indicates value-maximizing (overinvesting) firms.
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McConnell and Servaes (1990), Servaes (1991)], or firm’s investment opportunities [Lang,
Stulz, and Walkling (1991)], firm value [Morck, Shliefer, and Vishny (1988)].
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) use Tobin’s q to distinguish value-maximizing from
overinvesting firms. In their study, Tobin’s q is defined as the marginal return on firm’s
existing assets plus the marginal return on future investment opportunities.35 It is also
assumed that marginal returns o f capital are diminishing, implying that the marginal
return on existing assets is larger than marginal return on new investment. According to
Lang and Litzenberger (1989), for value-maximizing firms, marginal returns on new
investment are equal to (or larger than) the cost o f capital. Under conditions of decreasing
marginal efficiency of capital, the marginal return on existing assets is also larger than
the cost o f capital. Thus, Tobin’s q is larger than unity. On the other hand, for
overinvesting firms (i.e., firms with poor investment opportunities), the marginal return
on existing assets is less than the cost of capital.36 Under conditions of decreasing
marginal efficiency of capital, the marginal return on new investment is also less than cost

35 average Tobin’s q = (X/C)/K + [(I/C)/K] (P - K) T
= average returns on existing assets
+ average returns on future investment
where
X: expected earnings from existing assets
C: current capital stock
K: cost o f capital
I: future investment
P: average returns for firm
T: time period
P > K = X/C > K = q > 1 value-maximizing
X/C = P < K = q < 1 overinvesting

36 In reality, it is difficult to observe the marginal T obin’s q so that it is common to use average T obin’s
q-
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o f capital. Thus, Tobin’s q is less than unity.
In this study, Tobin’s q is used to distinguish value-maximizing (i.e., q > 1) from
overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1) to test the implications o f overinvestment hypothesis.
Consistent with Jensen’s (1986) overinvestment hypothesis, for value-maximizing firms,
marginal return on investments would be positive and thus increase the value of the firm.
On the other hand, for overinvesting firms, the marginal return on investments would be
negative and thus decrease shareholders wealth.
The procedure used by Lindenberg and Ross (L-R) (1981) to estimate Tobin’s q is
very complicated in terms of computational efforts and data requirements. That is,
replacement costs are complex to estimate.37 The information about replacement costs
of plant and inventory is available only for large firms over the period of 1974-1984.38
In addition, some databases are available only for manufacturing firms.39 Chung and
Pruitt (1994) developed a simple formula to approximate L-R’s Tobin’s q.40 The
advantages o f the approximate q are that (1) all data needed to calculate the Tobin’s q can
be obtained from the Compustat Industrial files and (2) it is simple to calculate q values.

37 The replacement costs are calculated by approximating the plant’s age and life and then adjusting its
book value for inflation. The replacement value o f inventory is determined by assuming that the book
value o f inventory equals its market value when firm uses first-in first-out (FIFO) accounting.
38 During the period of 1974-1984, only firms with net plant and equipment values in excess o f $120
million were required to report replacement costs o f plant and inventory to the FASB.
39 For instance, Manufacturing M aster File complied by the National Bureau o f Economic Research.
40 approximate q = (MVE PS + DEBT)/TA
where
M VE : product of a firm ’s share price and the number o f com mon stock shares outstanding, given
by COMPUSTAT (#24 x #25)
PS : the liquidating value o f the firm ’s outstanding preferred stock (#10)
DEBT: short-term (less than 1 year) liabilities net o f short-term assets (#5 - #4)
TA : book value o f the total assets (#6)
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To show how the value o f approximate q are close to the L-R Tobin’s q, Chung and
Pruitt (1994) run yearly OLS regression between q values from both the L-R and
approximate q formulas from 1978 to 1987. Their approximation o f q can explain 96.6%
of the variability o f the L-R Tobin’s q. They also show the comparison of L-R’s Tobin’s
q with approximate q for forty randomly selected firms, in which the two methods give
very close value with deviation less than 18%. The high degree o f observed consistency
between the L-R and the approximate q formulas over the 1978-1987 time period strongly
suggests that researchers can employ approximate q values with considerable confidence.
The approximate q is used here to distinguish between value-maximizing (i.e., q > 1) and
overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1).

b. Estimation of Abnormal Stock Returns

To measure the announcement effects o f investments, the event study methodology
[Brown and W arner (1985)] is used to obtain the abnormal returns. The initial
announcement date is designated as day 0 in event time and is verified by the Wall Street
Journal Index. The market model is used to estimate normal or expected common stock
returns. In the ordinary least squares model, returns on a given security are regressed
against the concurrent returns of the market. The CRSP equally weighted index is used
as a proxy for the market portfolio.
The market model is specified as:
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R j, = aj + bj R™ +

eJt

where
Rj, : the rate o f return on security j for event fay t

ai : estimation period intercept o f firm j
bj : OLS estimates o f firm j ’s market model parameters
R™, : the rate of return on the CRSP equally valued index on event day t
ejt : the error term of security j on the event day t

The potential for bias of the OLS br due to nonsynchronous trading and infrequent
trading, has been recognized [Eades, Hess, and Kim (1984)]. To correct this bias, the
method developed by Scholes and Williams (1977) is used to estimate the OLSb,.41 The
abnormal returns for an announcing firm are the differential between the actual returns
on its common stock and the contemporaneous expected return generated by the market
model. The abnormal returns for the common stock o f firm j on day t are obtained as
follows:

A R jt = Rjt - ( a j - b j R ^ , )

where
ARj, : abnormal return for firm j on event day t
R j,: daily return o f firm j common stock on event day t
Rn,, : daily return on the CRSP equally-weighted index for all common stocks on

41 Scholes and Williams (1977) develop a method o f estimating parameters using daily returns in case
of nonsynchronous or infrequent tradings.
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NYSE and AMEX (used as a proxy of the market portfolio of risky assets) on
event day t
aj : estimation period intercept of firm j
bj : OLS estimates o f firm j ’s market model parameters

The estimation period is from t = -120 to -30 relative

to the first date of

announcement in the Wall Street Journal Index, day t = 0 for the domestic plant
announcements. Daily abnormal returns are calculated for each firm in the sample over
the time interval t = -15 to t = +15.
For a sample of N firms, the daily average abnormal return for each day t isestimated
by

In the case of no abnormal returns, AR, has an expected value of zero.
Analysis o f statistical significance requires the standardization o f abnormal returns to
reflect statistical errors in the determination of expected returns. To determine whether
the average daily abnormal return is statistically significantly different from zero, the
average standardized abnormal return (ASAR,) is calculated.
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A S A R C=— Y ' *[ ^ 2 1 )
c
Sj t

where

gJt=(sj(

+

T7

r

))*/*

i= l

and
S2j : the residual variance for security j from the market model regression
N : the number o f observations during the estimation period
R,,,, : the returns on the market portfolio for the event day t
R„, : the average return of the market portfolio for the estimation period
R^j : the average return of the market portfolio for day i during the estimation period
T : the number of days in the estimation period
It is assumed that each of the abnormal returns is normally and independently
distributed across securities.
For each day, the following t-statistic is computed:

t= y/N (A SA R t )

To examine whether the cumulative average daily abnormal returns are significantly
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different from zero, the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for each security j, CAR,,
are calculated by summing average abnormal returns over event time as follows:

CA*j.K.Ls ' t A R jt
t=K

where the CARj KL is for the period from t = day K until t = day L.
The cumulative average abnormal returns over the event time from day K until day
L aie calculated by

“ ASjr.rriE CMj.K.L

The average standardized cumulative abnormal returns over the interval K to L are
obtained as follows:

L

ASCARKi l = J2

asark l

K

The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for several interval windows around the
announcement day are calculated.
Finally, t-statistics are calculated for CARKL by
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t=y/N(ASCARKiL) /y/K- L+1

V. Empirical Results

A. Overinvestment Hypothesis Tests

Panel A o f Table 1-4 presents the daily average abnormal returns during the period
of -5 to +5 days around the announcement day for the entire sample of domestic
investment (plant) announcements from 1980 to 1992.

[Insert Table 1-4 about here]

One day before announcement (day = -1), firms experience significant negative
abnormal returns o f -0.37% (t-statistic = -2.330). However, the average abnormal returns
at the announcement day (day = 0) are insignificant negative (-0.23%). Panel B of Table
1-4 shows that the cumulative average abnormal returns for several window intervals are
significantly negative. This evidence suggests that capital markets’ response to corporate
investment announcements is negative. Similar negative returns for corporate investments
are also reported in the study of acquisitions [Dodd (1980), Malatesta (1983)]. However,
the evidence reported in Table 1-4 is not consistent with McConnell and Muscarella’s
(1985) findings in which an increase in capital expenditures enhances firm value by
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Table 1-4
A. Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARS), t-statistics, % of Positive AARs for the Entire Sample
of Domestic Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms for Event Period of -5 to +5 Trading Days:
1980-1992 (Sample Size = 194). ***,*♦,* denote the significance at the 1%, 5 %, 10% level.
Day

Average Abnormal
Returns, AAR
-0.0025
0.0009
•0.0003
0.0010
-0.0037
-0.0023
-0.0023
-0.0000
0.0008
0.0022
•0.0020

-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5

t-statistics (p-value)

-2.313(0.021)**
0.453(0.650)
•0.160(0.872)
0.755(0.450)
-2.330(0.020)**
-0.868(0.386)
-1.377(0.169)
0.277(0.781)
1.057(0.291)
2.134(0.034)**
-1.095(0.274)

Positive AAR(%)

43.8
4S.5
48.4
49.5
37.6
42.8
49.5
51.5
48.4
54.1
44.8

B. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs), t-statistics for the Entire Sample of Domestic
Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms for Several Window Intervals: 1980-1992 (Sample Size
= 194) ***,**,* denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Trading
Interval

[-5 to
[-5 to
[-2 to
[-1 to
[-lto
[ 0 to

+5]
+1]
+1]
+1]
0]
+1]

Cumulative Average
Abnormal Returns

•0.0080
-0.0091
-0.0073
-0.0083
-0.0060
0.0046

t-statistics(p-value)

-1.050(0.294)
-2.219(0.027)**
-1.920(0.056)**
-2.656(0.008)*"
-2.273(0.024)**
1.596(0.111)

Note: Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with domestic investments by U.S. firms as
reported in the Wall Street Journal.
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1 . 2 1 %.

Although the results in Table 1-4 appear to be consistent with Jensen’s (1986)
overinvestment hypothesis, the sample may include different types o f firms with respect
to investment opportunities or level of free cash flows. The overinvestment hypothesis
implies that the valuation effects of corporate investment decisions depend on firm’s
investment opportunities. Using Tobin’s q as the measure of firm’s investment
opportunities, the sample is divided into two subsamples - value-maximizing and
overinvesting firms. Value-maximizing (i.e., q > 1) firms are expected to be better
managed and have positive NPV projects, whereas overinvesting (i.e., q < 1) firms are
likely to have no positive NPV projects. Hence, the overinvestment hypothesis predicts
that investment announcements by value-maximizing firms gain positive market returns,
while investment announcements by overinvesting firms suffer negative market returns.
Panel A of Table 1-5 provides the daily average abnormal returns for valuemaximizing and overinvesting firms.

[Insert Table 1-5 about here]

One day before the investment announcement (day = -1). value-maximizing firms
experience significant positive abnormal returns of 0.45% (t-statistic = 2.297). At the
announcement day (day = 0), these firms gain significant positive abnormal returns of
0.38% (t-statistic = 1.987). On the other hand, at day -1, overinvesting firms realize
significant negative abnormal returns of -0.74% (t-statistic = 4.499). At the announcement
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T a b le I-S

A. Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARS), % of the Positive AARs for the Domestic Investment
Announcements by U.S. Firms with q > 1 and q < 1, the t-statistics for the Daily Mean Differences of AARs
Between Two Samples for the Event Period -5 to 45 Trading Days: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in
parentheses). •**,**.* denote the significance at the 1%, 5% , 10% level.

Day

-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
41
42
43

Average Abnormal Returns, AAR,(%)
Tobin’s q
q> 1
q< 1
(N=61)
(N=133)
-0.0033(-1.884)‘
0.0017( 0.650)
-0.0009(-0.279)
0.0027( 0.450)
0.0045( 2.297)*"
0.0038( 1.987)"
-0.0025(-0.493)
-0.0027(-0.983)
0.0007( 0.409)
0.0057( 2.964)*"
0.0009( 0.498)

44

45

-0.0020(-1.466)
0.0006( 0.417)
0.0001( 0.126)
0.0002( 0.848)
-0.0074(-4.499)*“
-0.0051(-2.521)*“
-0.0022(-1.224)
0.0012( 0.988)
0.0010( 0.929)
0.0005( 0.393)
-0.0033(-1.682)‘

Positive AAR(%)
q > 1

42.6
50.8
50.8
54.1
54.1
52.5
52.5
47.5
45.9
59.0
47.5

q < 1

t-difTerence
AAR,,, - AAR,,,

44.4
48.9
47.4
47.4
30.1
38.3
48.1
53.3
49.6
51.8
43.6

-0.463
0.319
-0.293
0.678
4.263*"
3.514"*
-0.076
-1.139
-0.111
1.611*
1.171

B. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) for the Domestic Investment Announcements by Firms
with q > 1 and q < 1, the t-statistics for the Mean Difference of CAARs Between Two Samples for Several
Window Intervals: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in parentheses). ***,•*,* denote the significance at the 1%,
5% , 10% level.
Trading
Interval

[-5
[-5
[-2
[-1
[-1
[0

to +5]
to -1-1]
to -4-1]
to -fl]
to 0]
to 4-1]

Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, CAAR (%)
q> 1
q< 1
(N=61)
(N=133)
0.0107(1.482)
0.0060(0.692)
0.0086(2.036)"
0.0059(2.273)"
0.0083(3.160)*"
0.0013(1.109)

-0.0166(-2.260)**
-0.0159(-3.130)“ *
-0.0146(-3.677)*"
-0.0148(-4.719)*"
-0.0126(-4.859)*"
-0.0070(-2.663)”

t-Difference
CAAR,,, - CAAR,,,

2.814*"
2.832*”
4.233*"
5.118*"
6.257*"
2.751*"

Notes: (1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with domestic investments as reported in the Wall
Street Journal.
(2) if the value of the Tobin’s q is greater (less) than 1, the firm is classified into value-maximizing
(overinvesting) firm.
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day, these firms also suffer significant negative abnormal returns of -0.51% (t-statistic = 2.521). The mean differences between value-maximizing and overinvesting firms are
statistically significant at the 1% level for both days (-1, 0). This evidence implies that
the capital markets expect more value to be created when firms with profitable investment
opportunities announce their investment plans compared to firms with poor investment
opportunities (i.e., overinvesting firms).
Panel B of Table 1-5 presents cumulative average abnormal returns for valuemaximizing (i.e., q > 1) and overinvesting (i.e., q < 1) firms for several interval windows
around the announcement day. The results show that value-maximizing firms have
significant positive two-day abnormal returns of 0.83% (t-statistic = 3.160), while
overinvesting firms experience significant negative two-day abnormal returns of -1.26%
(t-statistic = -4.859). The mean difference for the two-day abnormal returns between the
two subsamples is statistically significant at the 1% level. This evidence indicates that
investment announcements by value-maximizing firms exhibit positive valuation effects
because the capital market believes that these firms are likely to undertake positive NPV
projects. On the other hand, investment announcements by overinvesting firms have
negative valuation effects because these firms are more likely to waste cash flows by
engaging in negative NPV projects. This is consistent with the prediction of the
overinvestment hypothesis. Although not in the context o f plant investments, Servaes
(1991) finds that bidder abnormal returns are higher for high q firms (i.e., q > 1).
Jensen’s (1986) argument implies that stock market returns associated with firm’s
investment opportunities depend on free cash flows. That is, since value-maximizing firms

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

40

are likely to use cash flows productively, no significant relation between the level of cash
flows and investment-related abnormal returns is expected. On the other hand, since
overinvesting firms are more likely to waste cash flows in negative NPV investments, the
level of free cash flows may have an adverse impact on the value of the firm. Thus, the
overinvestment hypothesis implies that, cross-sectionally, the abnormal returns must be
negatively related to the cash flows of overinvesting firms and unrelated to the cash flows
of value-maximizing firms.
To explore this implication o f the overinvestment hypothesis, this study examines the
cross-sectional relation between the level of free cash flows and the stock market returns
for a sample of value-maximizing and overinvesting firms, respectively. Panel A of Table
1-6 reports the results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions o f the two-day
cumulative abnormal returns for the announcements of domestic investments (plants) on
the free cash flows.

[ Insert Table 1-6 about here]

For value-maximizing firms, the relation between the two-day abnormal returns and
free cash flows is insignificantly positive (2.42%) (t-statistic = 1.303). For overinvesting
firms, the two-day abnormal returns are negative related to cash flows (-0.67%) (t-statistic
= 2.208). This evidence indicates that firms with profitable investment opportunities use
cash flows productively, while firms with poor investment opportunities are likely to
overinvest corporate free cash flows. These findings are consistent with the prediction of
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Table 1-6
A. OLS Estimates of Coefficients in Cross-Sectional Regressions of the Two-day
(-1,0) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR.,0) for the Domestic Investment
Announcements by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in parentheses). ♦**,**,*
denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
CAR(.10)q>i = a0 + a, FCF
CAR(.,i0)q<, - a0 + a, FCF
Tobin’s q

sample size

Intercept

Free'cash flow*

R2 (%)

q> 1

61

0.0436
(1.050)

0.0242
(1.303)

3.62

q< 1

133

-0.0038
(-0.849)

-0.0067
(-2.208)**

3.59

B. OLS Estimates of Coefficients in Cross-Sectional Regressions of the Two-day
(-1,0) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR.,0) for the Domestic Investment
Announcements by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in parentheses). ***,**,*
denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
CAR.,i0 = ao + a, Tobin’s q + a2 FCF
regl
intercept
Tobin’s q

-0.0129
(-3.979)***

-0.0003
(-0.129)

0.0081
(2.510)’**

Free cash
flow
R2 (%)

reg2

-0.0074
(-2.069)**
0.0086
(2.728)***

-0.0357
(-3.007)“ *
3.18

reg3

4.50

-0.0373
(-3.191)**’
8.08

1 The free cash flow is defined as operating income before depreciation minus interest expenses,
taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends, all o f which is divided by total assets for the
fiscal year before the investments [Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991)].
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overinvestment hypothesis and the empirical evidence reported by Lang, Stulz, and
Walkling (1991) on the relationship between abnormal returns and cash flows from
domestic acquisitions.
Panel B of Table 1-6 presents estimates of regressions of two-day abnormal returns
from the investment announcements on Tobin’s q and free cash flows for the entire
sample over the entire period. The first regression shows that the Tobin’s q coefficient
is positively related to the stock market returns, implying that domestic investments by
value-maximizing firms increase shareholder wealth. In the second regression, the relation
between abnormal returns and the level of free cash flows is negative and significant. It
implies that, as Jensen (1986) argues, the role o f free cash flows available to managers
is an important factor in explaining the negative relationship between investment
abnormal returns and cash flows. The negative relationship between abnormal returns and
the cash flows is retained even in the presence of the Tobin’s q variable. This result is
reported in the last column of the same Table.
Further, whether the abnormal returns associated with free cash flows differ for valuemaximizing and overinvesting firms is examined. Table 1-7 presents a 2 x 2 matrix in
which the sample of firms is classified according to Tobin’s q and free cash flows.

[Insert Table 1-7 about here]

The results show that value-maximizing firms (i.e., q > 1) with high free cash flows
appear to earn most significant positive returns o f 1.02% (t-statistic = 2.869), implying
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Table 1-7

Two-Day (-1,0) Cumulative Average Abnormal Stock Returns (CAR., 0), Classified
by Tobin’s q1 and Free Cash Flow2: Domestic Investments by U.S. Firms: 19801992. All data are obtained from COMPUSTAT. (t-statistics are in parentheses) ***,
**, * denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.

Tobin’s q

High FCF
Firms

Low FCF
Firms

Mean
Difference

q> 1

0.0102
(2.869)***
N=36

0.0072
(1.483)
N=25

0.0030
(0.8540)

q< i

-0.0155
(-4.296)***
N=67

-0.0094
(-2.575)**
N=66

-0.0061
(-1.587)

Mean
Difference

0.0257
(5.5650)***

0.0166
(3.1330)***

1 Tobin’s q is calculated using the formula provided by Chung and Pruitt (1994).
q > 1 (q < 1) indicates value-maximizing (overivesting) firms.
2 Free cash flows are estimated using the definition given by Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Lang, Stulz,
Walkling (1991). Specifically, free cash flows are defined as operating income before depreciation minus
interest expense, taxes, preferred and common dividends, all of which are divided by the book value of
total assets for the fiscal year before the investment The sample median (0.1339) o f free cash flows is
used to classify firms into the high and low free cash flow categories.
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that these firms create more wealth with cash flows. Also, regardless of the level of free
cash flows, capital markets respond positively to the investment announcements by valuemaximizing firms. On the other hand, overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1) with high free cash
flows incur significant negative returns of -1.55% (t-statistic

-4.296). This evidence

suggests that these firms have the greatest agency problems over the distribution of free
cash flows. In addition, capital markets seem to respond more vigorously to the
investment announcements o f overinvesting firms with high cash flows.

B. Type of Investment Tests

B l. Comparison of Valuation Effects Between Focus-Increasing and Diversifying
Investments

Although not in the context of plant investments, previous studies [Morck, Shliefer,
and Vishny (1990), Lang and Stulz (1994), John and Ofek (1995)] have presented
evidence in favor of the view that an increase in corporate focus is associated with
shareholder wealth maximization.
This section examines the valuation effects of two different types of plant
investments; that is, (1) focus-increasing and (2) diversifying investments. An investment
is classified as a focus-increasing investment if the 2-digit SIC code of the investment is
the same as the firm’s main COMPUSTAT 2-digit code. Otherwise, it is classified as a
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diversifying investment.42
Panel A of Table 1-8 presents the daily average returns for focus-increasing and
diversifying investments for the eleven trading days around the investment announcements
over the 1980-1992 period.

[Insert Table 1-8 about here]

At the announcement day, the abnormal returns for both samples appear to be
insignificant. On the other hand, on the day before (day = -1), diversifying investments
are associated with significant negative stock returns of -0.89% (t-statistic = -2.452),
whereas focus-increasing investments are associated with insignificant positive returns.
The results also show that mean differences between two samples are significantly
different at the 1% level.
Panel B o f Table 1-8 shows the cumulative abnormal returns for focus-increasing and
diversifying investments for several window intervals around the two-day announcement
period. Focus-increasing investments earn positive two-day abnormal returns of 0.09%,
implying that an increase in corporate focus are associated with value-increasing activities.
On the other hand, diversifying investments experience significant negative two-day
abnormal returns of -1.14% (t-statistic = -1.662), implying that corporate diversifying
investments are value-decreasing. Further, the mean differences between focus-increasing
and diversifying investments for the two-day abnormal returns are significant at the 5%

42 This measure is also used in M orck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), John
and Ofek (1995).
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Table 1-8
A. Comparison of Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARs), % of Positive AARs for the Focus-Increasing and
Diversifying Domestic Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms, t-statistics for the Daily Mean Differences
of AARs Between Two Samples for the Event Period -5 to -1-5 Trading Days: 1980-1992. (t-statistics are in
parentheses) *•*,**,* denote the significance at the 1%, 5% , 10% level.
Average Abnormal Returns, AAR,(%)
Focus-increasing
investments
(N=129)

Day

-0.0027(-0.857)
-0.0003( 0.074)
-0.0021( 0.624)
•0.0002( 0.082)
0.0005( 0.095)
0.0004( 0.086)
-0.0020(-0.723)
0.0004(-0.179)
-0.0011(-0.543)
0.0018( 0.428)
-0.0007(-0.149)

-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5

Diversifying
investments
(N=59)

Positive AAR(%)
Focus-increasing
investments

-0.005K-2.031)"
0.0032( 0.831)
-0.0017(-0352)
0.0026( 0.428)
-0.0089(-2.452)’~
-0.0025(-0.419)
-0.0047(-1.435)
-0.0022(-0.177)
0.0029( 0.467)
0.0045( 1.132)
-0.0042(-1.110)

Diversifying
investments

t-difference
- AAR,

41.4
48.3
43.8
49.1
50.4
51.6
43.2
55.9
42.5
523
45.7

46.6
51.2
46.1
53.9
38.5
47.7
45.8
48.1
533
52.0
47.4

0.7906
-1.2566
-13032
-0.8949
3.2665"*
0.7259
0.8684
0.7921
-1.5164
-0.8014
1.2469

B. Comparison of Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) for the Focus-Increasing and Diversifying
Domestic Investment Announcements, t-statistics the Mean Difference of CAARs Between Tow Samples for
Several Window Intervals: 1980-1992. (t-statistics are in parentheses) ***,**.» denote the significance at the
1%, 5% , 10% level.
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, CAAR (%)
Trading
Intervals

[-5
[-5
[-2
[-1
[-1
[0

to
to
to
to
to
to

+5]
+1]
-i-l]
4-1]
0]
4-1]

Focus-Increasing
investments
(N=129)

•0.0060( 0.803)
•0.0064( 0.824)
•0.0013( 0378)
-0.0011( 0348)
0.0009( 0335)
-0.0016(-0.251)

Diversifying
investments
(N=59)

-0.0127(-0.982)
-0.0137(-1.143)
-0.0136(-0.945)
-0.0162(-2.110)"
-0.0114(-1.662)’
-0.0073(-0.632)

t-Difference
C A A R ,^ - CAAR^,,

03074
0.7721
1.8271"
2.7180*"
2.7234"
13030

Notes: (1) Day 0 is the First announcement date associated with domestic investments as reported in
the Wall Street Journal.
(2) The investment is classified as focus-increasing if the 2-digit SIC code of the investment is
the same as the firm’s main 2-digit SIC code (i.e. firm’s core business). Otherwise, it is
classified as diversifying.
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level.
The findings in Table 1-8 appear to support the view that an increase in corporate
focus is consistent with the market value maximization hypothesis [John and Ofek (1995),
Comment and Jarrell (1995)], whereas corporate diversifying investments tend to decrease
shareholder wealth. The negative stock reactions associated with diversifying investment
announcements may be because diversifying investments are one way in which managers
waste cash flows at the expense of shareholder wealth [Jensen (1986)]. Another possible
explanation is that firms with poor investment opportunities in their core business are
likely to engage in diversifying investments [Lang and Stulz (1994)]. The results in Table
1-8 seems to be consistent as well with Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny’s (1990) findings of
higher bidder returns from related acquisitions (2.38%), than bidder returns from unrelated
acquisitions (-1.89%).
Further, this study examines the relation between the two-day abnormal returns and
type of investment for value-maximizing and overinvesting firms. Panel A of Table 1-9
presents the two-day abnormal returns for investments, classified by Tobin’s q and the
type of investment.

[Insert Table 1-9 about here]

Focus-increasing investments by value-maximizing firms (i.e., q > 1) gain the highest
two-day abnormal returns of 1.03% (t-statistic = 3.107), implying that focus-increasing
investments by firms with profitable investment opportunities create more wealth. On the
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Table 1-9
Comparision of Cumulative Average Abnormal Stock Returns (CARs.,j,, CAR.,,,,) for Domestic
Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms, Classified by Tobin’s q1 and type of Investment (focusincreasing vs diversifying)2 Classified by 2-Digit SIC Industry Code: 1980-1992. (t-statistics are in
parentheses) * * * * * * denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.

A. CAR (-1,0)

Focus-increasing

q>i

q<i
Mean
Difference

0.0103
(3.107)*"
N=47
-0.0064
(-2.209)"
N=82
0.0167
(4.236)*"

Diversifying

Mean Difference

0.0075
(1372)
N=14

0.0028
(0.436)

-0.0174
(-3.736)*”
N=45

0.0110
(2348)"

0.0249
(3.689)*“

B. CAR(-1,+1)

Focus-increasing

Diversifying

Mean Difference

q>i

0.0077
(2.616)**
N=47

0.0058
(0.812)
N=14

0.0019
(0.177)

q<i

-0.0078
(-1.947)*
N=82

•0.0231
(-4.360)***
N=45

0.0153
(2.537)**

0.0155
(3367)*"

0.0289
(3.535)*”

Mean
Difference

1 q > 1 (q < 1) indicates value-maximizing (overinvesting) firms.
2 The investment is classified as focus-increasing if the 2-digit SIC code of the investment is the
same as the firm’s main 2-digit SIC code (i.e. firm’s core business), otherwise, it is classified as
diversifying.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

49
other hand, diversifying investments by overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1) experience the
lowest two-day abnormal returns o f -1.74% (t-statistic = -3.736), suggesting that
diversifying investments by firms with poor investment opportunities substantially
decrease the value o f the firm. This evidence may also suggest that firms that decreasing
investment opportunities in their core-business engage in diversifying investments for
survival reasons. However, capital markets appear to penalize these firms for such
investments. Panel B of Table 1-9 provides evidence for the three-day abnormal returns.
The findings are similar to those of panel A of Table 1-9.43

B2. Pre- and Post-Investment Profitability Performance

In a recent study by John and Ofek (1995), it is reported that firms with focusincreasing asset-sales improve performance, while firms with diversifying asset-sales do
not. Using a sample o f domestic investments, this study examines changes in pre- and
post-performance of focus-increasing and diversifying firms.
To compare the mean and median change in profitability of firms with focusincreasing and firms with diversifying investments around the investment announcements,
three measures of profitability are used: (1) earnings before interest, taxes, and
depreciation (EBITD) to sales, (2) EBITD to book value of assets, and (3) EBITD to
market value o f equity. These ratios represent firm’s efficiency in operations [John and
Ofek (1995)]. To account for industry changes on the firm’s performance, industry-

43 The results remain essentially the same even when an eleven-day abnormal return window (i.e., -5
to +5) is used.
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adjusted profitability measures are used. The industry-adjusted measures are estimated by
subtracting from the firm’s change the median changes over the same period for all firms
in COMPUSTAT file with the same 2-digit SIC code.
Table I-10 presents the changes in pre- and post investment profitability o f focusincreasing firms and diversifying firms.

[Insert Table I-10 about here]

In the first two columns o f Table I-10, the mean and median o f operating margins for
focus-increasing firms are positive around investment announcements. The results show
that the mean changes in EBITD to sales ratio are 0.79%, 3.53%, and 6.85% from year
zero to year one, two, and three. This evidence indicates that firms with an increase in
focus improve their performance after investments. On the other hand, the third and fourth
columns of Table I-10 which report performance of firms with diversifying investments
show that the mean changes in EBITD to sales ratio are -4.08%, -5.62%, and 7.80% from
year zero to year one, two, and three. This result suggests that performance for firms with
diversifying investments appear to be deteriorating. The other two profitability measures changes in EBITD to assets (ROA) and change in EBITD to market value of equity show similar results. These results are consistent with John and Ofek’s (1995) findings
that, for firms with focus-increasing divestitures, the mean changes in EBITD to sales
ratios are 0.7%, 1.3%, and 2.3% from year zero to year one, two, and three, respectively.
For diversifying divestitures, the mean changes in EBITD to sales ratios are -1.7%, -2.9%,
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Table 1-10
Industry-adjusted Profitability Changes of Firms Around the Focus-Increasing and Diversifying Domestic
Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992. *,*•,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% , 1% level.
Industry-Adjusted
Performance
Measures

Focus-Increasing
Investments
Mean
Median1

Diversifying
Investments
Mean
Median

Difference between Samples
Mean

Median

A. Change in operating margin(EBl’l D/Sales)2
0.0083

year -2 to -1

0.0755'

0.0079

year -1 to 0

0.0934'

0.0768'

•0.0114

year 0 to +1

0.0079

0.0001

year 0 to +2

0.0353

year 0 to +3

0.0685

0.0019

0.0672'

0.0060

-0.0138

0.1048’

0.0966'

•0.0408

-0.0057

0.0487

0.0057

0.0018

-0.0562

-0.0470

0.0915"

0.0650

0.0273

-0.0780'

-0.0598

C.14S5"

0.0871'

B. Change in returns on assets (ROA)2
year -2 to -1

0.0969'

0.0413

0.0333

0.0368

0.1670'

0.0045

year -1 to 0

0.1052'

0.0823'

-0.0225

-0.0198

0.1277"

0.1021"

year 0 to -t-1

0.0015

0.0084

-0.0159

-0.0107

0.0174

0.0191

year 0 to +2

0.0461

0.0127

•0.0631

-0.0816'

0.1092"

0.0943'

year 0 to +3

0.0960'

0.0251

-0.1135"

-0.0952'

0.2097"

0.1203”

C. Change in EBITD/market value of euqity4
year -2 to -1

0.0118

0.0021

-0.0251

-0.0357

0.0369

0.0378

year -1 to 0

0.0637

0.0793"

•0.0291

-0.0229

0.0928"

0.1022"

year 0 to +1

0.0310

0.0112

-0.0948'

•0.0409

0.1258"

0.0528"

year 0 to +2

0.0620

0.0634

-0.0446

•0.0508

0.1066"

0.1142"

year 0 to +3

0.0750

0.0518

•0.0779'

-0.0551

0.1529"

0.1069'

1 Median singiflcance tests are based on the Wilcoxon signed rank test.
2 The difference between the change in operating margin from year to year and the median change in industry. The
operating m argin is defined as the ratio of EBITD (earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation) to sales.
5 The difference between the change in return on assets fron year to year and the median change in industry. The return
on assets is the ratio of EBITD/book value of total assets.
4 The difference between the change in EBITD/market value of equity from year to year and the median change in the
industry.
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and -3.0% from year zero to year one, two, and three, respectively. The evidence in Table
I-10 supports the argument that, even though firms attempt to invest outside their core
business in an effort to enhance their investment opportunities, firm performance is not
likely to improve [Lang and Stulz (1994)].

B3. The Relation Between Change in Post-Performance and Change in Focus

This section examines the relation between the change in post-performance of
investing firms and change in corporate focus. In this study, three focus measures are
used.44 The first measure of focus is to examine whether or not the investment is related
to the firm’s primary business. If the 2-digit SIC code of new investment is the same as
the firm’s main 2-digit business, the investment is classified as a focus-increasing
investment. Otherwise, investment is classified as a diversifying investment. The second
focus measure used is the number o f lines of business segments in which firms engage.
The increase in the number of business segments indicates that the firm’s degree of
diversification increases. The third focus measure used is the sales-based Herfindahl index
which is defined as the sum of the squared values o f sales per business segment as a
proportion of total firm sales. A sales-based Herfindahl index reflects the degree of which
sales are concentrated in a few o f a company’s business segments.45 Hence, the

44 Sec John and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarrell (1995) for discussion o f alternative business focus
measures.
45 See Lang and Stulz (1994) for a detailed description of the Herfindahl index as a measure o f
corporate focus.
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Herfindahl index falls as the degree of corporate diversification increases.46
Table I- 11 reports the relation between the changes in profitability from year zero to
year two and the change in corporate focus measures.

[Insert Table I - 11 about here]

The first regression shows that firm’s profit margin is positively related to the focus
dummy (16.93%), implying that focus-increasing investments raise firm’s profit margin.
Similar results are obtained when the two alternative focus measures - changes in the
number o f business segments and Herfindahl index - are used. The results also show that
when the number of business segments increases, the performance o f the firms
deteriorates. Similarly, an increase in the Herfindahl index tends to improve corporate
profitability performance. The other two profitability measures - EBITD to assets and
EBITD to market value of equity - also yield similar results 47 This evidence implies that
investments that increase firm’s focus tend to improve its performance two years after the
investment decision, whereas investments that do not increase the firm’s focus appear to
worsen its performance. Although in context o f divestitures, John and Ofek (1995)
provide similar evidence which shows that changes in firm’s profitability are positively
related to increase in corporate focus.

44 The data are obtained from Compustat Industry Business Segment file and the Directory o f
Multinationals.
47 The post-profitability results for a broader window interval (i.e., from year zero to year three) remain
essentially similar to those presented in Table 1-11. When indicator variables are used to capture the
change in the number o f business segments and the Herfindahl index, the results remained unchanged.
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Table M l

The Relation Between the Change In Post-Performance of the Investing Finns and the Change 'n Focus Around the Domestic Investment
Announcements by V S . Firms: 1980-1992. (t-statistlcs are in parentheses)
denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted change In EBITD/tales from year 0 to year 2'

regl
Intercept

-0.0827(-0.962)

focus dummy3

0.1693(1.650)'

change in the number of segments3

reg2
0.2110(1.100)

-0.1312t-l.387)

-0.0500(-1.858r
0.2782(1.899)"

change In the HerAndahl Index4
R3(%)

reg3

1.63

2.15

2 J3

Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted change In EBITD/assets from year 0 to year 2’

regl
intercept

-0.0976(.1.166)

focus dummy

0.1937(1.932)"

change In the number of segments

reg2
0.0952(1J53)

-0.1280(-1.708)

-0.0327M.728)’
0.2026(1.759)*

change In the HerAndahl Index
R3 (%)

reg3

2.19

1.84

1.91

Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted change In EBITD/market value of equity from year 0 to year 2‘

regl
intercept

-0.0504(-0.930)

focus dummy

0.1137(1.764)’

change In the number of segments

reg2
0.1291(1.008)

-0.0993H.458)

-0.0296M.718)'

change in the HerAndahl Index
R3 (%)

*tg3

0.2293(2.194)"
1.84

1.83

2.92

' The difference between the change in the investing firm ’s EBITD/sales from year 0 so year 2 and the median change in
the industry.
3 Focus dummy is 1 if the 2-digit SIC code of investment is the same as the firm ’s m ain 2-digit SIC code (i.e. Arm’s core
business), and 0 otherwise.
3 The change in the num ber of segments from year -1 to 0
4 Change in the HerAndahl index from years -I to 0. The HerAndahl index is calculated as the sum of segments’ sales
squared, divided by total sales squared.
9 The difference between the change in the investing firm ’s EBITD/assets from year 0 to year 2 and the median change in
the industry.
4 The difference between the change in the Investing Arm’s EBITD/market value of equity from year 0 to year 2 and the
median change in the industry.
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B4. The Relation Between Two-Day Stock Market Returns and Change in Focus

While Table 1-11 examines the relation between firm’s performance and the changes
in corporate focus, Table 1-12 analyzes the relation between the two-day cumulative
abnormal returns and the changes in focus. The two-day cumulative abnormal returns are
used as market’s immediate assessment of the firm’s profitability in response to its
investment announcements.

[Insert Table 1-12 about here]

The first regression shows that the focus dummy is positively related to the two-day
abnormal returns (0.59%) (t-statistic =

1.621), suggesting that focus-increasing

investments have 0.59% higher returns than diversifying investments. In the second
regression, the change in the number o f business segment variable is inversely related to
the two-day abnormal returns (-0.32%) (t-statistic = -3.456) as expected. It implies that
focus-increasing (i.e., when the number of segments decreases) investments are valueincreasing, while diversifying investments tend to destroy shareholder value. The third
regression reports a positive relation between the two-day abnormal returns and the
change in Herfindahl index. This evidence indicates that investment abnormal returns are
higher when firm’s Herfindahl index increases.48

48 The results remain similar in Table 1-12, even when indicator variables are used to capture the
changes in the number o f business segments and the Herfindahl index from year -1 to zero.
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Table 1-12

The Relation Between the Investing Finn’s Two-Day Cumulative Abnormal
Returns (CARs.10) and the Change in Focus around the Domestic Investment
Announcements by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in parentheses) * * * * * *
denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Dependent variable: Two-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns

observation
intercept
focus dummy1

regl

rcg2

reg3

191

184

178

-0.0094(-3.086)*’*

0.0056(1.611)

0.0059(1.621)*

change in the number of segments2

-0.0032(-3.456)“ *

change in the Herfindahl index3
R2 (%)

-0.0082(-2.025)**

0.0065(1.945)**
1.37

6.16

6.20

1 Focus dummy is 1 if the 2-digit SIC code of investment is the same as the firm’s main 2-digit
SIC code (i.e. firm’s core business), and 0 otherwise.
2 The change in the number of segments from year -1 to 0.
3 Change in the Herfindahl index from years -1 to 0. The Herfindahl index is calculated as the
sum of segments’ sales squared, divided by total sales squared.
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C. Cross-Sectional Analysis

Table 1-13 provides cross-sectional regression analysis results accounting for other
potential factors such as firm’s characteristics, size of investment, and taxes.

[Insert Table 13 about here]

The first regression shows the relation between the two-day abnormal returns and a
set of dummy variables for the type of investment and the firm’s investment opportunities.
Value-maximizing firms (i.e., high q) with focus-increasing investments realize significant
positive abnormal returns (t-statistic = 5.196), whereas overinvesting firms (i.e., low q)
engaging in diversifying investments experience significant negative abnormal returns (tstatistic = -4.261). Thus, focus-increasing investments increase shareholder wealth , while
diversifying investments decrease it.
In the second regression, the negative relation between the level o f free cash flows
and the two-day abnormal stock returns indicates that agency costs between managers and
shareholders rise as high free cash flows increase, supporting the prediction of the
overinvestment hypothesis.
The impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on the value o f the firm is also examined
in the third regression. The change in interest allocation rules introduced by the Tax
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Table M 3
Cross-sectional Regressions of the Two-day Announcement Period Abnormal Returns (CAR.,^) on
the Firm and Investment Characteristics for Domestic Investments by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992 (tstatistics are in parentheses) ***,**,* denote the significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
variable

reg 1
(N=191)

reg 2
(N=194)
-0.0003
(-0.129)

reg 3
(N=194)

reg4
(N=70)

-0.0077
(-3.420)“

■0.0076
(-0.490)

intercept

-0.0024
(-0.618)

high q/focus'

0.0226
(5.195)“

0.0128
(1.609)‘

high q/div1

0.0077
(1391)

0.0070
(0.737)

low q/div3

•0.0115
(-4.261)”

-0.0087
(-1.631)'

free cash flow

-0.0357
(-3.007)“

Tax4

-0.0202
(1328)*
0.0040
(1.147)

0.0009
(0.097)

size of
investment

0.0000
(1319)

log(asset)

-0.0027
(-0.535)

debt/assets

0.0162
(0.842)

ownership9

0.0001
(0.620)

foreign sales/
total sales

0.0002
(1346)

log(flrm size)

R1 ( % )

0.0025
(0.416)
16.10

4.50

0.69

34.76

1 The high q/focus is 1 if value-maximizing firms with focus-increasing investments , and 0
otherwise.
2 high q/div is 1 if value-maximizing firms with diversifyign investment, and 0 otherwise.
3 low q/div is 1 if overinvesting firms with diversifying investments, and 0 otherwise.
4 Tax is 1 if investments are made after 1986 Tax Reform, and 0 otherwise.
3 It is defined as percent of outstanding shares held by insiders.
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Reform Act of 1986 reduced tax deductibility of the U.S. interest expenses.49 Thus, it
is argued that the Tax Reform Act might have increased the firm’s cost of capital and
thus decrease its investment activities. The evidence in the third regression shows that
changes in the Tax Reform Act in 1986 do not have any influence on the value of the
firm around the two-day investment announcement period.
The fourth regression examines whether the two-day abnormal returns for corporate
investments are related to several other firm characteristics. It is predicted that, as firm’s
debt increases, managers are more closely monitored by creditors and have less cash
flows to undertake sub-optimal or value-decreasing investments [Jensen (1986)]. This
argument implies a positive relation between the stock market returns and firm ’s debt
ratios. Also, if managers have a large stake in the firm, they are less likely to invest in
negative NPV projects, predicting a positive relation between the two-day abnormal
returns and the proportion o f shares held by managers [Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld
(1985)].50 In addition, there is the argument that, since large firms have more resources,
larger internal capital markets, and economies of scale, firm size may be relevant in
explaining the abnormal returns associated with new domestic investments. Thus, the
coefficient of the firm size variable is expected to be positive. Even though the firm’s
debt ratio, the fraction of ownership held by managers, and the firm size variables have

49 In the Tax Reform Act o f 1986, the U.S. government sought to limit how much interest expense
multinational firms can deduct from their U.S. income. The loss o f tax deductibility o f interest
expense might lead multinational firms to borrow and invest less, scaling back the scope o f their
foreign and total operations.
30 Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld (1985) show that bidder returns increase with the faction o f bidder
equity held by managers.
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coefficients estimates of the same sign as predicted, none of the coefficients appear to be
significant at any conventional level.
The evidence in Table 1-13 also indicates that size of investment, firm’s asset size,
and ratios o f foreign sales to total sales appear to have little power to explain the stock
market returns for investments. Overall, the evidence shows that firm’s investment
opportunities (i.e. value-maximizing and overinvesting) and type of investment (focusincreasing and diversifying) are important determinants of gains from domestic
investments.

VI. Concluding Remarks

This paper examines the effects of corporate investment decisions on the value of the
firm, using a sample of domestic plant announcements by U.S. firms during the period
of 1980-1992. In this paper, two possible explanations associated with the valuation
effects of investments are considered: (1) firm’s investment opportunities and (2) type of
investment (focus-increasing and diversifying). The overinvestment hypothesis [Jensen
(1986)] implies that the impact of corporate investments on the value o f the firm depends
on the firm’s investment opportunities [Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991), Servaes (1991)]
and the agency costs associated with the managerial discretion of corporate free cash
flows. In addition, following Lang and Stulz (1994), it is expected that focus-increasing
investments are value-increasing activities, while diversifying investments are valuedestroying activities.
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In this study, the evidence is consistent with predictions of overinvestment hypothesis.
That is, value-maximizing firms realize positive stock returns for domestic investment
announcements, whereas overinvesting firms suffer losses. In addition, for overinvesting
firms, the relation between the two-day abnormal returns and the level of free cash flows
is significantly negative, indicating that agency costs increase with the level o f free cash
flows as predicted by the overinvestment hypothesis.
The evidence on the effects o f the type of investment on the value of the firm shows
that focus-increasing investments increase shareholder wealth, while diversifying
investments do not. That is, an increase in corporate focus is consistent with shareholder
wealth maximization [Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), Comment and Jarrell (1995), John
and Ofek (1995)]. In addition, pre- and post-performance tests provide evidence which
shows that focus-increasing investments tend to improve corporate performance, while
diversifying investments do not. This evidence appears to support the view [Lang and
Stulz (1994)] that diversifying investments are not value-increasing.
The cross-sectional analysis confirms these results. That is, the firm’s investment
opportunities and type of investment are important determinants o f the valuation effects
of corporate investment decisions. However, other control variables such size of
investment, taxes, ratio of foreign sales to total sales, fraction of shares held by managers,
and firm size are found to have little explanatory power.
Unlike previous studies which do not consider the firm’s investment opportunities and
the type of investments [Jensen and Ruback (1983), McConnell and Muscarella (1985),
Blackwell, Marr, and Spivey (1990)], this study provides evidence which shows that
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firm’s investment opportunities and the type of investment pursued by corporate managers
can explain why investment decisions may not always increase shareholder wealth .
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Abstract

This paper examines the valuation effects of corporate investment decisions for a
sample of foreign plant announcements by U.S. firms during the period 1980-1992. It is
found that value-maximizing firms (i.e., q > 1) earn significant positive abnormal returns,
while overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1) experience significant negative abnormal returns.
Especially, for overinvesting firms, there are significant agency costs associated with
managers’ discretion o f free cash flows. This evidence appears to support overinvestment
hypothesis. This study shows that diversifying investments decrease the value of the firm,
while focus-increasing investments do not, implying that increase in corporate focus is
consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. Further, it is found no difference in
abnormal returns between domestic and foreign investments. Accordingly, firm’s
investment opportunities and the type of investments are important determinants of gains
from corporate investments.
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I. Introduction

Essay I provided evidence on the valuation effects of domestic plant investment on
the value of the firm. In Essay II, the valuation effects of foreign plant investment are
examined. Foreign direct investments include mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, and
wholly-owned plants. Even though U.S. firms have long been building plants abroad, the
effects of the foreign plants on shareholder wealth have received little attention relative
to acquisitions and joint-ventures.1
Several theories have attempted to explain why firms invest abroad. The
internalization hypothesis suggests that foreign investment occurs when a firm is able to
increase its value by internalizing markets for its intangible firm-specific assets such as
management expertise, patent, and marketing skills.2 The imperfect capital market
hypothesis states that since there are barriers for international capital flows and
information asymmetry, multinational firms offer shareholders international diversification
opportunities.3 The tax avoidance or low-cost hypotheses imply that foreign expansion
increase firm value because it provides firm opportunities for tax arbitrage and access to
cheap labor costs.4 The multinational network hypothesis argues that a branching-tree

1See Fatemi (1984), Doukas and Travlos (1988), Morck and Yeung (1991), Doukas (1995) for valuation
effects o f international acquisitions and Finnerty, Owers, and Rogers (1986), Lee and W yatt (1990),
Crutchley, Guo, and Hansen (1991) for the effects o f international joint ventures on the value o f the
firm.
2 See Caves (1971), Hymer (1976), Morck and Yeung (1991), Lang and Ofek (1995).
3 See Agmon and Lessard (1977), Froot and Stein (1989).
4 See Scholes and W olfson (1990), Doukas (1995).
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expansion that takes an expanding firm into a new geographic market leads to increases
in shareholder wealth [Kogut (1983)]. All these theories imply that foreign direct
investments are likely to increase shareholder wealth.
Doukas and Travlos (1988) document that firms initially not operating in a target
firm’s country earn significant positive abnormal returns, while firms already operating
in a target firm’s country realize insignificant negative abnormal returns, which appear
to be consistent with the multinational network hypothesis.5 Consistent with the
internalization hypothesis, Morck and Yeung (1991) find, in a cross-section study, that
the value o f the firm is positively related to its multinationality, and its relationship is
explained by intangible firm-specific assets proxied by R&D and advertising spending.6
The valuation effects of foreign expansion through international joint-ventures have
been examined. Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991) show that U.S. firms experience positive
abnormal returns for U.S.-China joint ventures. They attribute the positive wealth gains
to expansion of firm’s global network into a new geographic market. Crutchley, Guo, and
Hansen (1991) also report that announcements o f U.S.-Japan joint ventures are associated
with positive abnormal returns which is explained by relative currency rate changes
between two countries, which support Froot and Stein’s (1989) model.7
In a study of U.S. foreign investments in Eastern Europe, Lang and Ofek (1995)

3 The multinational network hypothesis suggests that multinational firms benefit from establishing a
globally maximizing network, which allow firms to arbitrage institutional restriction, capture
information externalities, and improve production efficiency.
6 The multinationality is measured by number o f subsidiary and number o f country firms invest.
7 Crutchley, Guo, and Hansen (1991) study shows that shareholder gains is high for U.S. partners when
the Yen/$ is low.
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document that firm’s growth opportunities and low labor costs are positively related to
the gains from foreign expansion. Recently, Doukas (1995) reports that the abnormal
returns for foreign acquisitions are higher for firms with profitable investment
opportunities than firms with poor investment opportunities.8
Although previous studies [Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991), Morck and Yeung (1991),
Crutchley, Guo, and Hansen (1991), Lang and Ofek (1995)] have reported wealth gains
from international expansion, Finnerty, Owers, and Rogers (1986), Lee and Wyatt (1990)
report negative abnormal returns for international joint-ventures, implying that foreign
expansion may not be a value-increasing transaction. This latter evidence is not consistent
with market value maximization hypothesis.
A possible explanation is that foreign investments may be driven by managers’ selfinterests at the expense of shareholder wealth. Jensen (1986) suggests that managers with
free cash flows have a tendency to undertake negative NPV investments instead of
distributing them to shareholders. In this context, foreign direct investment may be one
way in which managers spend cash flows for their own benefit. The overinvestment
hypothesis [Jensen (1986)] implies that firms with poor investment opportunities are likely
to waste cash flows by engaging in negative NPV foreign projects, resulting in
overinvestment and, thus, a reduction in firm value. On the other hand, firms with
profitable investment opportunities are likely to use cash flows in positive NPV foreign
investments, resulting in an increase in firm value. Accordingly, the valuation effects of
foreign investment decisions may depend on firm’s investment opportunities.

8 Lang, Stulz, and Walkling find similar results in the case o f domestic acquisitions.
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Another possible explanation is that the valuation effects of foreign investments may
depend on the type of investment (i.e., focus-increasing and diversifying). Jensen (1986)
implies that corporate diversification may be the outcome o f investment decisions in
which managers waste cash flows for personal satisfaction. Although in the context of
domestic investments, the empirical evidence is in favor of an increase in corporate focus,
Morck, Shliefer, and Vishny (1990) document that, in the 1980s, unrelated domestic
acquisitions are value-decreasing transactions, while related domestic acquisitions are not.
Markides and Ittner (1994) also report that related foreign acquisitions are positively
associated with wealth creation. Lang and Stulz (1994) find, in a cross-sectional analysis,
that Tobin’s q, as proxy for firm value, and the degree of business diversification of firms
are negatively related throughout the late 1970s and 1980s. Their evidence suggests that
focus-increasing firms are valued more than diversifying firms. John and Ofek (1995)
show that firms that sell their domestic assets to increase corporate focus tend to improve
their performance after asset-sales.
This study provides direct evidence on the valuation effects of foreign investments,
using a sample of foreign plant announcements by U.S. firms during the period of 19801992. In this paper, two alternative explanations for valuation effects of foreign
investments are discussed: (1) the overinvestment hypothesis and (2) the type of
investment (i.e., focus-increasing and diversifying).
First, to explore whether the valuation effects of foreign direct investments are
associated with firm’s investment opportunities, the sample is classified into valuemaximizing and overinvesting firms, using Tobin’s q, as proxy for firm’s investment
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opportunities. The overinvestment hypothesis predicts that, for value-maximizing firms,
managers are likely to undertake value-increasing investments. Thus, foreign investments
by value-maximizing firms are expected to earn positive abnormal returns. On the other
hand, for overinvesting firms, managers are likely to waste cash flows by engaging in
negative NPV projects. Hence, foreign investments by overinvesting firms are expected
to exhibit negative abnormal returns.
The overinvestment hypothesis also implies that, since investments by overinvesting
firms are likely to be sub-optimal or negative NPV projects, the stock market returns are
likely to be negatively related to free cash flows. That is, agency costs associated with
the distribution o f free cash flows are expected to be greater for overinvesting firms. On
the other hand, since investments by value-maximizing firms are expected to be positive
NPV projects, the stock price reactions are not likely to be related to the firm’s level of
free cash flows. Accordingly, stock market returns and the level o f free cash flows are
expected to be negatively related for overinvesting firms and unrelated for valuemaximizing firms. This study provides cross-sectional evidence on the relation between
the firm’s level o f free cash flows and its stock market returns.
Second, to test whether the valuation effects of foreign investments depend on the
type o f investment, the sample is divided into focus-increasing and diversifying
investments. If diversifying investments are one way in which managers waste cash flows
for their own benefit at the expense of shareholders’ wealth [Jensen (1986)], or if an
increase in corporate focus enhances managerial efficiency, it is expected that focusincreasing investments realize positive abnormal returns, whereas diversifying investments
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experience negative abnormal returns. Furthermore, whether the abnormal returns
associated with the type of investment depend on firm’s investment opportunities is
analyzed. This study also presents comparison of pre- and post-performance between
focus-increasing and diversifying investments.
In general, like in Essay I, the results appear to be consistent with the predictions of
the overinvestment hypothesis. Value-maximizing firms earn significant positive abnormal
returns for foreign plant investments, while overinvesting firms realize significant negative
abnormal returns. Furthermore, the relation between stock market returns and the level
of free cash flows is significantly negative for overinvesting firms and unrelated for
value-maximizing firms. The evidence regarding the type o f investment shows that focusincreasing investments gain positive abnormal returns, while diversifying investments
experience significant negative abnormal returns. This evidence suggests that an increase
in corporate focus is consistent with shareholder wealth maximization [John and Ofek
(1995)]. In addition, firms that undertake focus-increasing investments improve their
performance after foreign investments, while firms that engage in diversifying investments
do not.
The valuation effects between domestic and foreign investments are also compared.
The results show no significant differences in abnormal returns between the two samples.
This evidence implies that the valuation effects of corporate investments seem to depend
on firm’s investment opportunities and the type of investment rather than the location of
the investment.
The paper is organized as follows: section II discusses the foreign investment
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decision. Relevant literature is reviewed in section HI. Section IV presents the valuation
effects of corporate foreign investment decisions. Section V describes the data and
methodology. Empirical results are presented in section VI. Section VII provides
concluding remarks.

II. Foreign Plant Investments

U.S. firms have long been investing in wholly-owned plants overseas. The potential
benefits associated with wholly-owned plants include: (1) protection of parent company’s
brand name or technology, (2) efficient use of resources by integrating cross-national
operations, and (3) greater ability of the parent company to control operations. On the
other hand, the potential costs include: (1) political risks, (2) social and cultural strains,
(3) problems of repatriating cash flows and assets, (4) difficulties in financing operations
and expansion, and (5) host country antagonism toward possible divestment.
Foreign plants are important in establishing the competitive position of firms in the
international markets.9 By manufacturing abroad, firms can enhance their long-term
business relations outside the U.S. and work closely with customers in order to better
design customers’ products.10 Firms could also gain access to local, immobile factors of

9 AT&T decides to manufacture residential telephones abroad in order to be price competitive (WSJ Jul.
8, 1985).
10 Motorola will begin to construct a $50 million assembly plant in Japan to produce semiconductors
for its customers in Asia. Responding to increasing demand from customers in Japan and elsewhere
in the Far East, the new plant will focus on the assembly o f both high-capacity memory devices, and
mid-range and high-end microcontroller chips (WSJ Apr. 30, 1990).
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production by locating their high-volume, labor-intensive operations in areas with low
labor costs11 and reduce transportation costs significantly by locating production facilities
close to customers.12 In addition, firms could avoid trade restrictions (i.e., tariffs and
quotas),13 or take advantage of special concessions granted by local governments in
foreign countries.14 Production abroad in several countries also enables firms to hedge
against a number of location-specific risks.
Basic methods used to evaluate foreign direct investment can be the same as those
applied to domestic investment. In both cases, it is necessary to estimate an appropriate
cost of capital and then, evaluate the expected cash flows from foreign investments.
However, due to foreign exchange risks, political risks, and government regulations, there
may be differences in the valuation effects between foreign and domestic investment
decisions. Foreign investment could be often longer, more costly, and more complex to
evaluate than domestic investment.15 Accordingly, it is argued that foreign operations

11 Wall Street Journal (Jan. 11, 1984) reports that Ford plans to build a $500 million plant in Mexico
reflects a move by auto makers to cut costs by going abroad.
12 Chrysler Corp. plans to move assembly of its Dodge Ramcharger utility vehicles to its truck plant
in Mexico City this fall from the current production site in W arren, Michigan. Chrysler plans to make
about 20,000 Ramchargers a year in Mexico and import them to the United States (WSJ Feb. 20,
1985).
13 The National Semiconductor Corp. plans to invest about $150 million to expand its operation in
Scotland, intensifying a push into Britain by U.S. and Japanese chip producers. The orders are surging
in Europe, reflecting demand from com puter companies and auto makers. The Common M arket’s
17.5% tariff on imported semiconductors is also spurring major non-European producers to increase
manufacturing in the European Community (WSJ Mar. 6, 1984).
14 M otorola agreed to build a $22 million factory in Sri Lanka. The factory will assemble and test
semiconductor electronic devices. The plant will be built in a free trade zone, where special
concessions are granted to manufacturers to foster employment (WSJ Oct. 29, 1980).
15 Also see Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) for a discussion o f the valuation effects between domestic
and cross-border acquisitions.
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must be more profitable than comparable domestic operations [Fatemi (1984)]. To explore
whether there are any gain differences between foreign and domestic investments, the
valuation effects between foreign and domestic plant investments are compared.

III. L iteratu re Review

A. The Foreign Investm ent Decision

Doukas and Travlos (1988) find that the valuation effects of international acquisitions
depend on the degree o f foreign exposure of U.S. bidding firms in the target firm’s
country. The evidence shows that firms not operating in a target firm’s country, earn
significant positive stock market returns from foreign investing through acquisitions. They
attribute the positive stock market returns to firm’s multinational network structure and
its ability to exploit international distortions in capital markets or production. In constrast,
firms already operating in a target firm’s country experience insignificant negative
abnormal returns upon foreign expansion. Although they attribute the negative stock
reaction to no change in the firm’s multinational network, this might be also explained
by its overinvestment behavior.
Morck and Yeung (1991) report evidence supporting the internalization hypothesis
in the sense that foreign investment gains are attributed to the firm’s intangible assets
rather than its multinationality per se.16 However, their study does not provide evidence

16 Intangible assets (i.e. management skills, patent, marketing expertise, R&D, and advertising
expenditures) are proxy for growth opportunities.
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on the market response to foreign expansion announcements by U.S. firms. Later, Morck
and Yeung (1992), in an event study using a sample o f 322 foreign acquisitions by U.S.
firms between 1978 and 1988, document that foreign acquisitions appear to increase the
value o f the firm only for firms possessing intangible assets (i.e., firms with growth
opportunities).
The effects of international joint ventures on the value o f the firm are mixed. In a
sample of 118 international joint ventures over the period of 1976-1979, Finnerty, Owers,
and Rogers (1986) find insignificant negative stock market returns for international joint
ventures. Lee and Wyatt (1990) also report, in a sample of 211 international joint ventures
over 1974-1986, that international joint ventures are, on average, associated with
significantly negative stock price reactions.17 However, these negative stock market
returns [Finnerty, Owers, and Rogers (1986), Lee and Wyatt (1991)] may driven by the
fact that their samples consist of firms with poor investment opportunities.
In contrast, Lummar and McConnell (1990) document that U.S. partners of
international joint ventures earn positive abnormal announcement returns, suggesting that
joint-ventures are value-increasing activities. Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991) examine the
valuation effects o f U.S. international joint ventures with a single country - China. They
show that U.S. firms gain significant positive abnormal returns of 0.52%. Crutchley, Guo,
and Hansen (1991) also show that, in a sample of 146 joint ventures between Japanese
and U.S. firms over the 1979-1987 period, U.S. shareholders gain positive abnormal
returns. However, their study reports weekly abnormal returns. This approach could not

17 Lee and W yatt (1990) suggest that Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis might explain negative
abnormal returns for international joint ventures. However, they do not provide empirical test.
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identify the market reaction to foreign expansion announcements. The results reported in
Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991) and Crutchley, Guo, and Hansen (1991) are limited in that
their investigations are country-specific. Also, the positive stock market returns may be
attributed to the fact that their samples include firms with profitable investment
opportunities.
Lang and Ofek (1995) document that stock markets react positively to U.S. firms’
investment announcements in Eastern Europe.18 Their cross-sectional analysis shows that
gains from foreign investments depend on the magnitude of U.S. firm’s intangible assets
and low labor cost in the host country. However, since 74% of their sample include jointventures, their results may be driven by characteristics associated with joint-ventures.
Thus, it is difficult to draw parallel conclusions on the valuation effects of foreign direct
investments.
Doukas (1995), in a sample of 463 international acquisitions over the 1975-1989
period, reports that firms with high q (i.e., q > 1) realize significant positive returns,
whereas firms with low q (i.e., q < 1) exhibit insignificant negative abnormal returns. This
evidence indicates that Tobin’s q, proxy for management performance, explains the
differential gains associated with foreign acquisitions.
Although the empirical works on corporate international expansion [Doukas and
Travlos (1988), Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991), Morck and Yeung (1991)] have attributed
the wealth gains from foreign investments to several factors, no study with the exception
of Doukas (1995), has been able to investigate the foreign investment decisions from an

18 In the sample of sixty-one foreign investments in Eastern Europe, there are forty-seven joint ventures,
seven acquisitions, and nine company-owned start-ups.
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agency theoretic perspective. This paper attempts to explain the valuation effects of
foreign plant investments in the context of Jensen’s (1986) overinvestment hypothesis.

B. Types of Investment Decisions

Although Hisey and Caves (1985) have addressed the issue o f what explains the
choice between related and unrelated foreign investments, little evidence on the effects
of the type of investment on the value o f the firm has been provided. Doukas and Travlos
(1988) report that the stock market returns for foreign acquisitions are insignificant with
regards to the type of acquisition undertaken (i.e, related and unrelated). In their study,
the gains from foreign acquisitions appear to be driven mainly by geographical
diversification rather than product diversification.
In a sample of 159 foreign acquisitions in the U.S. during the period of 1970-1987,
Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) find that the relatedness of business units of target and
bidder are not significantly related to the stock market returns for U.S. targets. However,
their classification is based on product description given in the Wall Street Journal
announcements of the cross-border takeovers.19
Black and Rose (1991) examine a sample of 132 U.S. industrial firms over the period
1980-1986. They conclude that Tobin’s q is not significantly related to firm’s degree of
diversification, measured by the Herfindahl index. As discussed in Morck and Yeung
(1992), this approach does not allow any inference of causality between the type of

19 Dummy variable takes on the value of one if foreign buyer already has operations in the target’s line
o f business, and otherwise zero.
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investment and its valuation effects. Thus, an event study could be appropriate for testing
the causal linkage between the type of investment and stock market returns [Lang and
Ofek (1995)].
Pettway, Sicherman, and Spiess (1993), in a sample of fifty-three Japanese
acquisitions of U.S. firms between 1981 and 1991, also document that the wealth gains
o f Japanese firms are not significantly related to the type of investment (i.e., related and
unrelated). In their study, since there are no industry SIC codes available for Japanese
firms, only the industry names are compared. However, this matching process may not
be precise.
Markides and Ittner (1994) provide evidence in favor of an increase in corporate
focus in context of U.S. foreign acquisitions. Their cross-sectional analysis shows that the
industry relatedness variable is positively related to the two-day abnormal returns,
implying that related foreign investments are associated with higher benefits than
unrelated investments.
In previous studies regarding the valuation effects of the type of investment,
classification scheme may have been ambiguous and less precise [Harris and Ravenscraft
(1991), Pettway, Sicherman, and Spiess (1993)]. Also, the relation between the level of
Herfindahl index and firm value has been examined [Black and Rose (1991)]. In additon,
cross-sectional evidence on the relation between stock market returns and the type of
investment (i.e., related and unrelated) has been provided [Doukas and Travlos (1988),
Black and Rose (1991), Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), Pettway, Sicherman, and Spiess
(1993), Markides and Ittner (1994)]. Accordingly, previous studies on the effects of the
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type of foreign investment on firm value is inconclusive. Further, there is no direct
evidence, to our knowledge, on the effects of focus-increasing and diversifying foreign
plant decisions on the value of the firm.

VI. V aluation Effects o f C o rp o rate Investm ent Decisions

A. O verinvestm ent H ypothesis

A traditional investment decision rule states that managers should undertake only
positive NPV projects. That is, if the discounted value of expected cash flows from
foreign investment is positive, the decision to undertake such an investment would
increase the value of the firm. Thus, announcements of an increase (decrease) in foreign
investments are expected to have positive (negative) stock market returns.
Agency costs between managers and shareholders are discussed by Jensen and
Meckling (1976). Unless managers are constrained by monitoring or bonding, they would
make corporate decisions that maximize their own utility. Jensen (1986) argues that there
are agency costs associated with the distribution of free cash flows. That is, managers
with high cash flows have a tendency to overinvest by undertaking negative NPV projects
instead o f distributing cash flows to shareholders. Jensen’s (1986) overinvestment
hypothesis predicts that firms with poor investment opportunities tend to waste cash flows
by engaging in sub-optimal or negative foreign investments, resulting in overinvestment
and a reduction o f the value o f the firm. On the other hand, firms with profitable
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investment opportunities use cash flows in positive NPV foreign projects, resulting in
shareholder wealth maximization. Thus, the overinvestment hypothesis indicates that the
valuation effects o f foreign investment decisions may depend on firm’s investment
opportunities.
This paper tests the overinvestment hypothesis by analyzing the effects of foreign
investment decisions on the value of the firm. Foreign investments may be one way in
which managers spend cash flows for their own benefit at thQ expense of shareholder
wealth. Testing for the overinvestment hypothesis requires knowledge of firm’s
investment opportunities. This paper uses Tobin’s q to distinguish value-maximizing (i.e.,
q > 1) from overinvesting (i.e., q < 1) firms.20 According to the overinvestment
hypothesis, foreign investment announcements by value-maximizing firms are expected
to realize into positive abnormal returns, while foreign investment announcements by
overinvesting firms are expected to produce negative abnormal returns.
The overinvestment hypothesis also suggests that the free cash flows available to
managers are important in explaining market reaction to the foreign investment
announcements. Because overinvesting firms are likely to waste cash flows in sub-optimal
or negative NPV investments, free cash flows might increase agency costs between
managers and shareholders, implying a negative relation between the level of cash flows
and stock market returns. On the other hand, because value-maximizing firms are likely
to spend free cash flows on value-increasing investments, no relation between the level
of cash flows and stock market returns is expected. To test this implication, this study

20 See Lang and Litzenberger (1989) for the use o f Tobin’s q as an indicator o f overinvestment.
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analyzes the cross-sectional relation between stock market returns and cash flows for
value-maximizing and overinvesting firms, respectively.
Further, to examine the extent of abnormal returns associated with free cash flows and
firm’s investment opportunities, the sample is divided into four subsamples according to
firm’s investment opportunities and level o f free cash flows: (1) value-maximizing firms
with high free cash flows, (2) value-maximizing firms with low free cash flows, (3)
overinvesting firms with high free cash flows, and (4) overinvesting firms with low free
cash flows. Foreign investment announcements by overinvesting firms with high free cash
flows are expected to yield the lowest abnormal returns since these firms are likely to
have the highest agency costs and undertake negative NPV projects. On the other hand,
value-maximizing firms are expected to earn positive abnormal returns regardless of the
level of free cash flows since these firms are expected to use cash flows in positive NPV
investments.

B. Type of Investment Decisions

This section examines whether the type of foreign investment (i.e., focus-increasing
and diversifying) decision has any differential effects on the value of the firm. Benefits
and costs associated with diversification strategy are well-known. As discussed in Essay
I, diversification benefits include: (1) greater operating efficiency,21 (2) less incentive

21 Chandler (1977) argues that, diversified firms are more efficient and profitable than their line of
business would be separately since diversified firms have better coordination than focused firms.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

85
to pass up positive NPV projects,22 and (3) greater debt capacity, and lower taxes.21
Diversification costs include: (1) the use o f increased discretionary resources to undertake
value-decreasing investments, (2) information asymmetry costs between central and
divisional managers24, (3) cross-subsidies that allow poor segments to drain resources
from better performing segments, and (4) misalignments of incentives between core and
non-core business.25 However, the overall valuation effects of foreign diversification
have not been thoroughly examined.
Some studies have explained the valuation effects of corporate diversification through
acquisitions in the context o f agency theory [Jensen (1986), Morck, Shliefer, and Vishny
(1989)]. Agency theory states that diversification is undertaken for reasons other than
market value maximization. Managers’ incentives to invest abroad in unrelated business
(i.e., relative to the firm’s core business) may be motivated by managers’ objectives such
as compensation, power, and job satisfaction including reduction of their employment
risk.26 Jensen (1986) argues that managers with high cash flows are more likely to

22 Weston (1989) states that diversified firms have large internal capital markets so that they make more
positive NPV investments than focused firms.
23 Lewellen (1971), Majd and M yers (1987) argue that diversified firms are predicted to have more tax
advantage than focused firms since diversified firms have greater debt capacity.
24 Harris, Kribel, and Raviv (1982) suggest that information asymmetry costs are higher in diversified
firm than in focused firms, resulting in reduction of the value of the firm than their lines o f business
would be separately.
25 Myer, Milgrom, and Roberts (1992) argue that unprofitable lines o f business create greater value
losses in conglomerates than they would as stand-alone firms.
26 Amihud and Lev (1981) argue that managers have incentive to reduce their employment risk.
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undertake diversifying investments (i.e., in pursuit of a diversification progrrm27) instead
of distributing cash flows out to shareholders. Hisey and Caves (1985) propose that
international diversification may occur to reduce managers’ job risk even though
shareholders could achieve international diversification themselves. Morck, Shliefer, and
Vishny (1988) suggest that managers often overinvest beyond the value-maximizing level
and pursue value-decreasing diversifying strategies for their own benefits at the expense
of shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) argue
that managers can entrench themselves by making manager-specific investments, implying
that diversification is not consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. That is,
managers may attempt to diversify due to firm’s poor financial performance relative to
other firms in the same industry. Such diversified investments may make it costly for
shareholders to replace existing management.
Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) suggest that bidding firm ’s experience in the target’s
industry is an important determinant of gains from cross-border takeovers. Markides and
Ittner (1994) also argue that related foreign investments are associated with higher
benefits and lower integration costs than unrelated acquisitions, implying a positive
relation between the stock market returns and focus-increasing investments.
Balck and Rose (1991) and Lang and Stulz (1994) find a negative relation between
Tobin’s q and the degree of corporate diversification, suggesting that the capital markets
value focus-increasing investments more than diversifying investments. It may be because

27 The increase in oil price generated large cash flows in the oil industry in the late 1970s and early
1980s. However, oil industry managers did not pay out the cash flows to shareholders. Instead, they
launched diversification programs to invest funds outside the industry (i.e., M ontgomery by Mobil,
Reliance Electric by Exxon). These acquisitions turned out to be unsuccessful.
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focus-increasing firms might have a competitive advantage in core-business, while
diversifying firms might have not such an advantage. However, in Black and Rose (1991)
and Lang and Stulz (1994), changes in either the number of business segments or the
Herfindahl index are estimated to measure the degree of corporate diversification, instead
of comparing the SIC digit code of new investment with that of firm’s primary business.
This paper provides direct evidence on the valuation effects o f focus-increasing and
diversifying investments, using a sample o f foreign plant announcements. The sample is
classified into focus-increasing and diversifying foreign investments. If diversifying
foreign investment is one way in which managers waste cash flows for their own benefit
at the expense of shareholders [Jensen (1986)], Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989)], or
if an increase in corporate focus enhances managerial efficiency, it is expected that focusincreasing foreign investments gain positive stock market returns, while diversifying
foreign investments exhibit negative abnormal returns.
To examine whether the abnormal returns associated with firm’s type of investment
differ between value-maximizing and overinvesting firms, the sample is classified into
four subsamples according to firm’s managerial characteristics and type of investment:
(1) value-maximizing firms (i.e., q > 1) with focus-increasing investments, (2) valuemaximizing firms with diversifying investments, (3) overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1) with
focus-increasing investments, and (4) overinvesting firms with diversifying investments.
Focus-increasing investment announcements by value-maximizing firms are expected to
generate the largest abnormal returns, since these investments are likely to be more valueincreasing. On the other hand, diversifying investments by overinvesting firms are
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expected to produce the lowest abnormal returns, since these firms are known to engaging
in value-decreasing transactions and their new investments will signal to the capital
market that the managers are not in the pursuit of strengthening the firm’s core-business.
Furthermore, Lang and Stulz (1994) argue that firms which have limited growth
opportunities in their core-business are likely to engage in diversifying investments.
However, such firms may lack the required competitive edge in non-core business and
thus should not be expected to benefit from diversification activities. Consistent with Lang
and Stulz (1994), John and Ofek (1995) report that focus-increasing asset-sales are
associated with an improvement in firm performance, while diversifying asset-sales are
not. This study examines the cross-sectional relation between corporate focus and post
investment performance.

V. D ata an d M ethodology

A. Data

The sample o f this essay consists of foreign plant announcements by U.S. firms
during the period o f 1980-1992.28 The sample is collected from the annual edition of the

28 For example,
Baxter International plans to build a $19 million plant in Singapore for the production o f kidney
dialysis equipment (WSJ Jun.26, 1980).
Analog D evice is spending a $44 million to build a wafer-fabrication plant, Limborick, Ireland
(WSJ Nov. 06, 1984).
Digital Equipment Corp. plans to build a $105 million semiconductor plant near Edinburgh,
Scotland: the plant will supply semiconductors mostly for Digital computers sold in Europe
(WSJ Aug. 01, 1985).
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Wall Street Journal Index. Once the announcement dates are identified, other relevant
information is obtained from the articles reported in the Wall Street Journal.
The sample is collected based on the following criteria: (1) firms should be U.S.
manufacturing companies, (2) firms should be listed on NYSE or AMEX, and (3) CRSP
and COMPUSTAT tapes are available for the firms. Firms announcing purchase of
equipment or machinery or capital budgeting, and purchase of plant from other companies
are excluded. Also, excluded are firms with other corporate announcements around fifteen
days of foreign plant announcements. This screening procedure produces a sample of 156
foreign investment announcements.
The sample is divided into value-maximizing and overinvesting firms, using Tobin’s
q. If a firm has q > 1 (sample size = 42), it is classified as a value-maximizing firm.
Otherwise, a firm with q < 1 (sample size = 114) is classified as an overinvesting firm.
The sample is also classified into high and low free cash flow firms. Lehn and Poulsen
(1989) define the free cash flow as operating income before depreciation minus interest
expenses, taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends. In this study, the value of
normalized free cash flows is used as in Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991). Lang, Stulz,
and Walkling (1991) normalize free cash flows by dividing them by the book value of
the total assets since large firms are more likely to have higher cash flows. If the free
cash flows of a firm is larger (smaller) than the sample median, it is classified as high
(low) free cash flow firm.
The sample is also divided into firms with focus-increasing investments (sample size
= 105) and diversifying (sample size = 41) investments. An investment is classified as
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focus-increasing if the 2-digit SIC code of the investment is the same as firm’s main 2digit code (i.e., firm’s core business). Otherwise, it is classified as a diversifying
investment.
Table II-1 shows the frequency distribution of the sample of foreign investment
announcements by year during the period of 1980-1992. The 156 announcements are
made by 76 U.S. firms.

[Insert Table II-1 about here]

Table II-2 presents the frequency distribution o f foreign investment announcements,
classified by the 2-digit SIC industrial codes.

[Insert Table II-2 about here]

Most foreign investment announcements occurred in the following industries:
transportation and equipment, chemicals, electronic equipment, machinery industries, and
food products. However, foreign investment activity represents a relatively broad spectrum
of industries.
The frequency distribution of foreign investment announcements by region is reported
in Table II-3.

[Insert Table II-3 about here]
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Table IM
Frequency Distribution of the Foreign Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms:
1980-1992.

Year

Frequency

1980

18

1981

12

1982

10

1983

7

1984

16

1985

11

1986

10

1987

10

1988

11

1989

8

1990

16

1991

11

1992

16

Total

156
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Table II-2

Frequency Distribution of the Foreign Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms, Classified
by Industry (2-digit SIC code): 1980-1992
2-Digit
SIC code

Industry Group

Frequency

20

Food and kindred products

12

21

Tobacco products

2

22

Textile mill products

1

26

Paper and allied products

3

28

Chemicals and allied products

39

29

Petroleum refining

7

30

Rubber and plastic products

5

32

Stone, clay, and glass products

1

33

Primary metals

5

34

Fabricated metal products

1

35

Indust, machinery & computer equip.

17

36

Electronic equipment

20

37

Transportation equipment

33

38

Measuring instr., photography, watches

6

39

Misc. manufacturing industries

1

48

Communication

2

78

Motion pictures

1
156
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Table II-3

Frequency Distribution of the Foreign Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms by
Region: 1980-1992
Region1

Frquency

South East
Asia

23

China

5

Japan

7

Western
Europe

69

Eastern
Europe

7

Middle
East

1

Canada

23

Mexico

14

South
America

7

Total

156

1 South East Asia: Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Sri Lanka.
Western Europe: U.K. Ireland, Holland, Belgium, Spain, Germnay, France, Italy, Austria,
Portugal, Luxemburg.
Middle East: United Arab Emirate
South America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guyana
Eastern Europe: Poland, Czech, Russia
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Southeast Asia has a sample size o f twenty-three. China has a relatively small sample
size of five. Western European countries appear to be the target countries of U.S. foreign
investments (sample size = 67). Eastern European countries have a sample size of five.
Canada and Mexico appear as regions in which U.S. firms prefer to invest (sample size
= 37). It may be due to geographical proximity.
Table II-4 presents summary statistics of the sample of firms with foreign
investments, including Tobin’s q, free cash flow, ratio of debt to total assets, ratio of
R&D to sales, ratio of advertising expenditure to sales, insider ownership (i.e, proportion
of outstanding shares held by insiders), ratio of foreign sales to total sales, size of
investment, and firm size.29

[Insert Table II-4 about here]

Panel A shows summary statistics for the entire sample. Panel B provides the
summary statistics for the sample of value-maximizing firms (i.e., q > 1) and Panel C
reports summary statistics for overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1). It is evident that valuemaximizing firms have higher mean R&D to sales ratio than overinvesting firms,
suggesting that value-maximizing firms have

more

growth

opportunities than

overinvesting firms. Insiders appear to control a smaller fraction o f shares in valuemaximizing firms than in overinvesting firms, implying that value-maximizing firms are

29 The data o f Tobin’s q and firm size are obtained from COMPUSTAT. The insider ownership (i.e.,
the proportion o f shares held by insiders), ratio o f foreign sales/total sales are provided from the
Value Line Investment Survey. The size o f investment is from the Wall Street Journal.
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Table II-4
Summary Statistics for Firms with the Foreign Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992

N

Mean

Std. dev

Minimum

Maximum

Panel A: Entire sample
Tobin’s q
Free cash flow/total assets'
Total debt/total assets
R&D/sales
Advertising/sales
Insider ownership2
Foreign sales/total sales
Size of investment ($ million)
Firm Size ($ million)

156
156
155
142
92
129
141
109
156

0.9105
0.1357
0.2154
0.0433
0.0274
0.0821
0.3118
199.0100
11261.2900

0.8937
0.0567
0.1333
0.0343
0.0265
0.1051
0.1561
384.8600
14700.7900

0.0160
-0.0064
0.0101
0.0035
0.0057
0.0500
0.0000
3.0000
126.6700

5.7660
0.3378
0.6232
0.2501
0.1259
0.6370
0.7200
2400.0000
75346.9600

Panel B: High q firms3
Tobin’s q
Free cash flow/total assets
Total debt/total assets
R&D/sales
Advertising/sales
Insider ownership
Foreign sales/total sales
Size of investment ($ million)
Firm Size ($ million)

42
1.8620
1.2770
42
0.1502
0.0556
41
0.1886
0.1202
34
0.0622
0.0425
35
0.0456
0.0343
34
0.0504
0.5306
37
0.3821
0.1253
142.4700 229.2000
38
42 18508.7900 23321.5800

1.0000
0.0534
0.0249
0.0056
0.0090
0.0600
0.1500
5.0000
686.2300

5.7660
0.3378
0.5762
0.1763
0.1259
0.1800
0.6400
1000.0000
75346.9600

Panel C: Low q firms
114
0.5599
Tobin’s q
114
Free cash flow/total assets
0.1304
Total debt/total assets
114
0.2250
112
R&D/sales
0.0374
57
Advertising/sales
0.0163
Insider ownership
95
0.0935
104
Foreign sales/total sales
0.2868
Size of investment ($ million) 81
218.5100
114 8657.7500
Firm Size ($ million)

0.2076
0.0564
0.1370
0.0291
0.0098
0.1165
0.1589
425.1200
18723.5300

0.0160
-0.0064
0.0101
0.0035
0.0057
0.0500
0.0000
3.0000
126.6700

0.9580
0.3000
0.6232
0.2501
0.0567
0.6370
0.7200
2400.0000
34836.5300

1 The free cash (low is defined as in Lehn and Pouisen (1989) (i.e., operating income before depreciation
minus interest expense, taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends).
1 It is defined as percent of outstanding shares held by insiders. The data are collected from several issues
of the Value Line Investment Survey.
1 High (low) q indicates value-maximizing (overinvesting) firms.
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more widely owned than overinvesting firms. In addition, ratios of foreign sales to total
sales appear to be higher for value-maximizing firms than for overinvesting firms,
suggesting that value-maximizing firms have more international involvement than
overinvesting firms. In terms o f market capitalization, value-maximizing firms are, on
average, larger than overinvesting firms.

B. Methodology

1. Estimation of Tobin’s q

Tobin’s q, defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the replacement cost
of its assets, is used to explain cross-sectional differences in investment opportunities and
management performance.30 For example, Tobin’s q is used as measure o f management
performance across firms [Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989), McConnell and Servaes
(1990), Servaes (1991), Doukas (1995)], or firm’s investment opportunities [Lang, Stulz,
and Walkling (1991), Doukas (1995)], firm value [Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988)].
Lang and Litzenberger (1989), among others, use Tobin’s q to distinguish valuemaximizing from overinvesting firms. They defined Tobin’s q as the marginal return on

30 For example, the relationship between managerial equity ownership and firm value [Morck, Shliefer,
and Vishny (1988) M cConnell and Servaes (1990)], the relationship between managerial performance
and tender offer gains [Lang, Stulz, and W alkling (1989)).
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firm ’s existing assets plus the marginal return on future investment opportunities.31 It is
assumed that marginal returns o f capital are diminishing, implying that the marginal
return on existing assets are larger than marginal returns on new investment. According
to Lang and Liztenberger (1989), for value-maximizing firms, the marginal return on new
investment is equal to (or larger than) the cost o f capital. Under conditions of decreasing
marginal efficiency of capital, the marginal return on existing assets is also larger than
the cost of capital. Thus, Tobin’s q is larger than unity. On the other hand, for
overinvesting firms, the marginal return on existing assets is less than the cost of capital.
Under conditions of decreasing marginal efficiency of capital, the marginal return on new
investment is also less than the cost o f capital. Thus, Tobin’s q is less than unity.
In this study, Tobin’s q is used to distinguish value-maximizing (i.e., q > 1) from
overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1) to test the implications of overinvestment hypothesis.
Consistent with Jensen’s (1986) overinvestment hypothesis, for value-maximizing firms,
the marginal return on foreign investments is expected to be positive and thus increase
the value of the firm. On the other hand, for overinvesting firms, the marginal return on
foreign investments is expected to be negative and therefore reduce shareholder wealth.

31 Average Tobin’s q = (X /Q /K + [(I/C)/K] (P - K) T
= average returns on existing assets
+ average returns on future investment
where
X: expected earnings from existing assets
C: current capital stock
K: cost o f capital
I: future investment
P: average returns for firm
T: tim e period
P > K = (X/C) > K : q > 1 value-maximizing
(X/C) < K = P < K : q < l overinvesting
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The procedure used by Lindenberg and Ross (L-R) (1981) to obtain Tobin’s q is very
complicated in terms o f computational effort and data requirements.32 That is,
replacement costs are complex to estimate.33 The information about replacement costs
of plant and inventory is available only for large firms over the period of 1974-1984.34
Chung and Pruitt (1994) developed a simple formula to approximate the Tobin’s q.35
The advantages of the approximate q are that (1) all data needed to calculate the Tobin’s
q can be obtained from the COMPUSTAT industrial files and (2) it is simple to calculate
q values. To show how the approximate q values are related to the values of L-R Tobin’s
q, Chung and Pruitt (1994) run yearly OLS regressions between q values from both he
L-R and approximate q formulas for 10 years from 1978 to 1987. The approximate q can
explain 96.6% of the variability of the Tobin’s q. They show the comparison of
Lindenberg-Ross’s Tobin’s q with approximate q for 40 randomly selected firms, in which
the two methods give close value with the deviation less than 18%. The very high degree
of observed consistency between the L-R and the approximate q formulas, over the 1978-

32 Manufacturing M aster File compiled by the National Bureau o f Econom ic Research has information
only for manufacturing firms.
33 The replacement costs are calculated by approximating the p lan t's age and life and then adjusting its
book value for inflation. The replacement value o f inventory is determined by assuming that the book
value o f inventory equals its market value when firm uses first-in first-out (FIFO) accounting.
34 During the period o f 1974-1984, only firms with net plant and equipment values in excess of $120
million were required to report replacement costs of plant and inventory to the FASB.
35 Approximate q = (MVE + PS + DEBT)/TA
where
MVE: product o f a firm ’s share price and the number o f com mon stock shares outstanding, given
by COM PUSTAT (#24 x #25)
PS : liquidating value of the firm ’s outstanding preferred stock (#10)
DEBT: short-term (less than 1 year) liabilities net o f short-term assets (#5 - #4)
TA : book value o f the total assets (#6)
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1987 period, strongly suggests that researchers can employ approximate q values with
considerable confidence. In this paper, the approximate q is used to distinguish valuemaximizing (i.e., q > 1) from overinvesting (i.e., q < 1) firms.

2. Estimation of Abnormal Returns

To measure the announcement effects of foreign investments (plants), the event study
methodology [Brown and Warner (1985)] is used. The initial announcement date is
designated as day 0 in event time and is verified in the Wall Street Journal Index. The
market model is used to estimate normal or expected common stock returns. In the
ordinary least squares model, returns on a given security are regressed against the
concurrent returns of the market. The CRSP equally weighted index is used as a proxy
for the market portfolio.
The market model is specified as:

Rj. = «i + bj Rm. + eji
where
R j,: the rate of return on security j for event day t
a j : estimation period intercept of security j
bj : OLS estimate of security j ’s market model parameters
Rn,, : the rate of return on the CRSP equally valued index on event day t
eJt : the error term of security j on event day t
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The potential for bias o f the OLS bj, due to nonsynchronous trading and infrequent
trading, has been recognized [Eades, Hess, and Kim (1983)]. To correct the bias, the
method developed by Scholes and Williams (1977) is used to estimate the OLS bj.36
The abnormal returns for an announcing firm are the differential between the actual
returns on its common stock and the contemporaneous expected returns generated by the
market model. The abnormal returns for common stock of firm j on the day t are obtained
as follows:

AR.. = Rjt - (3j - bj R J

where
A R j,: abnormal returns for firm j on event day t
Rj, : daily return of firm j common stock on day t
Rn,, : daily return on the CRSP equally-weighted index for all common stock on the
NYSE and the AMEX (used as a proxy of the market portfolio o f risky assets)
on event day t
aj : estimation period intercept o f firm j
bj : OLS estimate of firm j ’s market model parameters

The estimation period is from t = 120 to t = -30 relative to the first date of
announcement in the Wall Street Journal Index. Day zero (t = 0) represents the foreign

36 Scholes and W illiams (1977) develop a method o f estimating parameters using daily returns in case
o f infrequently traded securities.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

101
plant announcement event day. The abnormal returns are calculated for each day in the
event period which starts 25 trading days before the plant opening announcement and
stops 30 trading days after the announcement. Daily abnormal returns are calculated for
each firm in the sample over the time interval t = - 1 5 t o t = +15.
For a sample of N firms, a daily average abnormal return for each day t is estimated
by

In the case of no abnormal performance, AR, has an expected value o f zero. Analysis
of statistical significance requires the standardized abnormal returns to reflect statistical
error in the determination o f expected return. To determine whether the average daily
abnormal return is statistically significantly different from zero, the average standardized
abnormal return (ASAR,) is calculated.

where

and
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s J, Ct = r s ?3 ( i + —
+ —N :
'p

)]

1/2

E

j= l

Sj : the residual variance for security j from the market model regression
N : the number o f observations during the estimation period
R,,,, : the return on the market portfolio for the day t
: the average return of the market portfolio for day i during the estimation period
: the average return of the market portfolio for the estimation period
T : number of days in the estimation period

It is assumed that each of the abnormal return terms is normal and independent across
securities. For each day, the following t-statistic is calculated as:

t=y/N(ASARt )

To examine whether the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) are significantly
different from zero, the cumulative abnormal returns for each security i, CARj, are
calculated by summing average abnormal returns over event time as follows:
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L
CARj, k,

ARj t
t-K

where the CARj KL is for the period from t = day K to t = day L. The cumulative average
abnormal returns over the event time for day K until day L are calculated by

CAAR«.L=iE CARj.k. l
j-1

The average standardized cumulative abnormal returns over the interval from day K
to day L are obtained as follows:

L

ASCARKi l = Y , ASARKi l

K

The cumulative abnormal returns for several interval windows around the
announcement day are calculated.
Finally, t-statistics are calculated for CARKL by

t=,/N(ASCARK'L) / , / K - L + l
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VI. Empirical Results

A. Overinvestment Hypothesis Tests

Panel A of Table 11-5 shows the daily abnormal returns for the event period of -5 to
+5 days around the announcement day (t = 0) for the entire sample of foreign investment
announcements during the period of 1980-1992.

[Insert Table II-5 about here]

One day before the announcement (day = -1), firms experience significant negative
abnormal returns of -0.23%. However, at the announcement day, the abnormal returns are
negative and insignificant at any conventional level. Panel B of Table II-5 presents the
cumulative average abnormal returns for several window intervals. The results show that
foreign plant investments exhibit significant negative two-day stock returns of -0.42%,
implying that foreign investments have an adverse effects on the value of the firm. This
evidence is consistent with findings reported in Lee and Wyatt (1986) that, at the
announcement day, firms engaging in international joint ventures experience negative
abnormal returns of -0.46%. However, these results reported in Table II-5 are in contrast
with Lang and Ofek’s (1995) findings which show that firms investing in the Eastern
European countries earn a two-day significant positive abnormal return of 1%. However,
the results of these two studies are not directly comparable with those reported here since
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Table II-5
A. Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARs), t-statistics, % of Positive AARs for the Entire Sample of the
Foreign Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms for the Event Period >5 to +5 Trading Days: 1980-1992
(Sample size = 156). *•*,**,* denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Day

Average Abnormal
Returns

-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5

0.0009
0.0011
0.0018
0.0009
•0.0023
-0.0018
0.0013
•0.0009
0.0008
0.0014
0.0007

t-statistics(p-value)

0.643(0.521)
0.762(0.446)
0.891(0.401)
1.104(0.271)
-1.749(0.082)’
-0.798(0.425)
0.655(0.513)
-0.549(0.583)
0.237(0.812)
0.689(0.491)
0.232(0.816)

Positive AAR(%)

51.3
52.6
50.6
53.8
44.2
46.2
50.0
50.0
45.5
45.5
55.1

B. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs), t-statistics for the Entire Sample of Foreign Investment
Announcements by U.S. Firms for Several Window Intervals: 1980-1992. ♦**,**,* denote the significance at
the 1%, 5% , 10% level.
Trading
Interval
[-5
[-5
[-2
[-1
[-1
[0

to
to
to
to
to
to

+5]
+1]
+1]
+1J
0]
+1]

Cumulative Average
Abnormal Returns, CAAR
0.0038
0.0018
•0.0020
-0.0029
•0.0042
-0.0005

t-statistics (p-value)

0.623(0.533)
0.551(0.582)
-0394(0.693)
-1.092(0.276)
-1.810(0.073)*
-0.101(0.919)

Notes: Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with foreign investments by U.S. firms as reported
in the Wall Street Journal.
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their inferences are primarily drawn from foreign joint venture rather than direct
investment transactions.
Although the results in Table II-5 appear to be consistent with Jensen’s (1986)
overinvestment hypothesis, the sample of foreign investments analyzed in this study may
contain different types of firms with respect to investment opportunities or level of free
cash flows. Since the overinvestment hypothesis implies that the valuation effects of
corporate investment decisions depend on firm’s investment opportunities, this issue is
examined next using Tobin’s q as the measure o f firm’s investment opportunities. The
sample is divided into two subsamples - value-maximizing (i.e., q > 1) and overinvesting
(i.e., q < 1) firms.37 Value-maximizing firms are expected to be better managed and have
positive NPV foreign investments, whereas overinvesting firms are likely to have no
positive NPV foreign investments. Accordingly, investment announcements by valuemaximizing firms should cause positive market returns, while investment announcements
by overinvesting firms should produce negative market returns.
Panel A o f Table II-6 presents the daily average abnormal returns for valuemaximizing and overinvesting firms.

[Insert Table II-6 about here]

One day before the foreign investment announcement (t = -1), value-maximizing firms

37 Lee and W yatt (1991) divide their sample o f international joint ventures into three groups according
to the econom ic status o f the foreign partner’s home country. However, they find negative abnormal
returns for all these three groups.
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Table II-6

A. Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARS), % of Positive AARs for the Foreign Investment Announcements
by U.S. Firms with q > 1 and q < 1, t-statistics for the Daily Mean Differences of AARs Between Two
Samples for the Event Period -5 to +5 Trading Days: 1980-1992.(t-stastistics are in parentheses) •**,**,*
denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Average Abnormal Returns, AAR,(%)
Tobin’s q
q> 1
q <i
(N=114)
(N=42)

Day

-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5

-0.0007(0.133)
0.0020(0.897)
0.0042(0.977)
0.0003(0.047)
0.0069(2.287)“
0.0059(2.744)’“
0.0009(0.073)
0.0029(0.972)
0.0030(0.721)
0.0012(0.275)’
0.0016(0.518)

0.0016( 0.672)
0.0007( 0347)
0.0010( 0391)
0.0012( 1.262)
-0.0058(-3.436)’“
-0.0©49(-2.599)’“
0.0015( 0.722)
-0.002K-1.234)
O.OOOK-O.159)
0.0013( 0.972)
0.0004(-0.043)

Positive AAR(%)
q >1

q< i

47.6
50.0
593
52.4
69.0
593
54.8
52.4
47.6
45.2
52.4

533
52.6
48.2
55.2
35.1
41.2
49.1
50.0
45.6
44.7
56.1

t-difference
AAR^, - AAR^j
•0.668
0.480
0.742
-0.258
3.63r "
2.737*"
-0.147
1.447
0.841
-0.016
0318

B. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) for the Foregin Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms
with q > 1 and q < 1, t-statistics for the Mean Difference of CAARs Between Two Samples for Several
Window Intervals: 1980-1992. *•*,**,* denote the significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.

Trading
Interval
[-5
[-5
[-2
[-1
[-1
[0

to
to
to
to
to
to

+5]
+1]
+1]
+1]
0]
+1]

Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, CAAR (%)
Tobin’s q
q>i
q< i
(N=114)
(N=42)
0.0284(2.793)“
0.0196(2.707)"
0.0140(2.576)"
0.0138(2.947)’“
0.0128(3358)"’
0.0068(1.992)“

-0.0049(-0.935)
-0.0045(-0.998)
-0.0078(-2.025)“
-0.0091(-3.067)” ’
-0.0106(-4.267)’“
-0.0033(*1327)

t-Difference
CAAR,,, - CAAR,,,

3 301"’
2.914’“
3.247’”
3.935’"
4348’”
2.035"

Notes: (1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with foreign investments as reported in the Wall
Street Journal.
(2) If the value of Tobin’s q is greater (less) than 1, the firms is classified into value-maximizing
(overinvesting) firm.
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(i.e., q > 1) gain significant positive abnormal returns of 0.69% (t-statistic = 2.287). At
the announcement day (t = 0), there are also significant positive abnormal returns of
0.59% (t-statistic = 2.744). On the other hand, at day -1, overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1)
realize significant negative abnormal returns of -0.58% (t-statistic = -3.436). At the
announcement day, significant negative abnormal returns of -0.49% (t-statistic = -2.599)
are observed as well. The mean differences between value-maximizing and overinvesting
firms are significant at the 1% level for both day -1 and day 0. Panel B provides the
cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) for foreign investments for several interval
of windows. The results show that value-maximizing firms earn significant positive twoday abnormal returns o f 1.28% (t-statistic = 3.558), whereas overinvesting firms realize
significant negative returns of -1.06% (t-statistic = -4.267). The difference between the
two samples are significant at the 1% level.
These results imply that the capital markets expect more value to be created when
firms with profitable investment opportunities announce foreign investments. On the other
hand, foreign investment announcements by overinvesting firms cause negative valuation
effects because these firms are more perceived to waste cash flows by engaging in suboptimal or negative NPV investments. This is consistent with the predictions of the
overinvestment hypothesis. This evidence also appears to be consistent with the results
reported in Doukas (1995) where he shows that U.S. acquiring firms with high q values
(i.e., q > 1) gain significant positive two-day abnormal returns of 0.41% from foreign
acqusitions, while U.S. acquiring firms with low q values (i.e., q < 1) experience
insignificant negative returns of -0.18%.
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Jensen’s (1986) argument implies that stock market returns associated with firm’s
investment opportunities depend on the agency costs over the firm’s discretion o f free
cash flows. That is, since value-maximizing firms are likely to use cash flows in valueincreasing investments, no significant relation between the level of cash flows and
investment-related abnormal returns is expected. On the other hand, since overinvesting
firms are more likely to waste cash flows by engaging in sub-optimal or negative NPV
investments, the level of free cash flows may have an adverse impact on the value of the
firm. Thus, the overinvestment hypothesis implies that, cross-sectionally, the abnormal
returns for investments must be negatively related to the cash flows of overinvesting firms
and r irelated to the cash flows of value-maximizing firms.38
To explore this implication of the overinvestment hypothesis, this study examines the
cross-sectional relation between the level of free cash flows and the stock market returns
for both value-maximizing and overinvesting firms, respectively. Panel A of Table II-7
reports the results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the two-day
cumulative abnormal returns for foreign announcements on level of free cash flows.

[Insert Table II-7 about here]

For value-maximizing firms (i.e, q > 1), as predicted, the relation between the twoday abnormal returns and the level of free cash flows is insignificantly positive. For
overinvesting firms (i.e, q < 1), the two-day abnormal returns are negatively related to the

38 Lang, Stulz, and W alkling (1991) discuss the empirical implication o f free cash flow hypothesis.
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Table II-7
A. OLS Estimates of Coefficients in Cross-Sectional Regressions of Two-day (-1,0)
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR.I0) for the Foreign Investment Announcements by
U.S. Firms: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in parentheses). ****** denote the significance at
the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
CARj.ijhc),! = ao + a, FCF
CAR,.Ii#)iq<l —a® + a, FCF
Tobin’s q

sample size

Intercept

Free cash flow1

R2 (%)

q>i

42

0.1111
(0.835)

0.1110
(0.134)

4.000

q<i

114

-0.0001
(-0.020)

-0.0820
(-1.866)**

3.200

B. OLS Estimates of Coefficients in Cross-Sectional Regressions of Two-day (-1,0)
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR., 0) for the Foreign Investment Announcements by
U.S. Firms: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in parentheses). *•*,**,* denote the significance at
the 1%, 5%, 10% level.

CAR.10 = a0 + a, Tobin’s q + a2 FCF
regl
intercept
Tobin’s q

-0.0099
(-3.020)***

0.0048
(0.812)

0.0061
(2.372)***

Free cash
flow
R2 (%)

reg2

3.520

reg3
0.0007
( 0.122)
0.0069
(2.682)***

-0.0671
(-1.671)*

-0.0830
(-2.086)**

1.780

6.190

1 The free cash flow is defined as operating income before depreciation minus interest expenses,
taxes, preferred dividends, and common dividends, all of which is divided by total assets for the
Fiscal year before the investments [Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991)].
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level of free cash flows (t-statistic = -1.86). These results indicate that firms with
profitable investment opportunities use cash flows productively, while firms with poor
investment opportunities are likely to overinvest free cash flows. This evidence is
consistent with the predictions of the overinvestment hypothesis and Doukas’s (1995)
evidence, based on a sample of foreign acquisitions, which reports that bidder returns are
a decreasing function o f cash flows for low q firms (i.e., q < 1) and unrelated to cash
flows for high q firms (i.e. q > 1). Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) report similar results
for domestic acquisition transactions.
Panel B shows estimates of regressions of the two-day abnormal returns from the
foreign investment announcements on Tobin’s q and free cash flows for the entire sample.
The first regression shows Tobin’s q coefficient being positively related to the abnormal
returns, implying that foreign investments by value-maximizing firms increase the value
of the firm. In the second regression, the relation between the level of free cash flows and
abnormal returns is inverse, as expected, and significant. This result implies that, as
Jensen (1986) argues, the role of free cash flows available to managers is an important
determinant in explaining the market reaction to foreign investment announcements. The
negative relationship between abnormal returns and the cash flow variable is retained even
in the presence of the Tobin’s q variable. This result is reported in the last column of
Table II-7.

[Insert Table II-8 about here]
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Table II- 8
Two-Day (-1,0) Cumulative Average Abnormal Stock Returns (CAR., 0), by Tobin’s
q1 and Free Cash Flow2: Foreign Investments by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992. All data
are obtained from COMPUSTAT (t-statistics are in parentheses). *♦*,**,* denote the
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.

T obin’s q

q>1

q < 1
M ean
Difference

High FCF
Firms

L ow FCF
Firms

0.0173
(2.978)’**
N=24

0.0066
(1.079)
N=18

0.0107
(1.18)

-0.008
(-1.440)*
N =57

-0.0053
(-1.085)

-0.0133
(-1.570)**
N=57
0.0306
(4.502)*’*

Mean
Difference

0.0146
(1.892)**

1 Tobin’s q is calculated using the formula provided by Chung and Pruitt (1994).
q > 1 (q < 1) indicates value-maximizing (overinvesting) firms.
2 Free Cash Flows are estimated using the definition given by Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Lang,
Stulz, and Walkling (1991). Specifically, free cash flows are defined as the operating income
before depreciation minus interest expenses, taxes, preferred dividends for the fiscal year before
the announcement divided by the book value of total assets. The sample median (0.1244) of free
cash flows is used to classify firms into the high and low free cash flow categories.
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Further analysis, reported in Table II-8, shows that value-maximizing firms (i.e., q
> 1) with high free cash flows appear to gain substantial significant positive abnormal
returns of 1.73% (t-statistic = 2.869), implying that these firms create more shareholder
wealth with free cash flows. That is, regardless of the level of free cash flows, capital
markets respond positively to the foreign investment announcements of value-maximizing
firms. On the other hand, overinvesting firms (i.e., q < 1) with high free cash flows
realize the lowest abnormal returns of -1.33% (t-statistic = -1.570). This evidence suggests
that these firms have the greatest agency costs over the distribution o f free cash flows.
In addition, capital markets seem to respond negatively and vigorously to foreign
investment announcements of overinvesting firms with high cash flows. Consistent with
the evidence reported in Essay I, the valuation effects of foreign investments depend on
firm’s investment opportunities and the agency cost associated with the distribution of
cash flows.

B. Type of Investment Tests

B l. Comparison of Valuation Effects Between Focus-Increasing and Diversifying
Investments

Essay I provided evidence in favor of the view that increases in corporate focus,
based on domestic investment decisions, are associated with shareholder wealth
maximization. This section examines the valuation effects of focus-increasing and
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diversifying foreign investments. An investment is classified as a focus-increasing if the
2-digit SIC code of the investment is the same as the firm’s main 2-digit business (i.e.,
core business) reported in COMPUSTAT. Otherwise, it is classified as a diversifying
investment.39
Panel A of Table EI-9 presents the daily average abnormal returns for focus-increasing
and diversifying investments for the eleven trading days around the foreign investment
announcements over the period o f 1980-1992.

[Insert Table II-9 about here]

At the announcement day, the abnormal returns for both samples appear to be
insignificant. On the other hand, one day before (day = -1), diversifying investments are
associated with significant negative returns of -0.94% (t-statistic = 2.452), whereas focusincreasing investments are associated with insignificant positive returns. The results also
show that mean differences between two samples are significant at the 5% level. Panel
B of Table II-9 reports the cumulative abnormal returns for focus-increasing and
diversifying investments for several trading intervals. Focus-increasing investments appear
to earn positive tow-day abnormal returns of 0.10%, while diversifying investments
experience significant negative abnormal returns of -1.25% (t-statistic = -1.662). The
mean difference test, for the two-day abnormal returns, between focus-increasing and
diversifying investments is significant at the 5% level.

39 This measure is used in several papers [Kaplan and W eisbach (1992), John and Ofek (1995)].
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T ab le II- 9

A. Comparison of Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARs), % of Positive AARs for the Focus-Increasing and
Diversifying Foreign Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms, t-statistics for the Daily Mean Differences of
AARs Between Two Samples for the Event Period -5 to +5 Trading Days: 1980-1992. (t-statistics are in
parentheses) *•*,**,* denote the significance at the 1%, 5% , 10% level.
Average Abnormal Returns, AAR,(%)
Focus-increasing
Diversifying
investments
investments
(N=105)
(N=41)

Day

-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5

B.

0.0011( 0.732)
0.0009( 0.609)
0.0018( 0.484)
0.0010( 1.194)
0.0000( 0.171)
0.0010( 0.757)
0.0015( 0.720)
-0.0009(-0.622)
0.0011( 0306)
0.0010( 0.809)
0.0015( 0.794)

-0.0029(-1.126)
-0.0006(-0.134)
0.0023( 0.979)
0.0006( 0.465)
-0.0094(-3J24)*~
-0.0030(-0.751)
0.0047( 1314)
0.0012( 0377)
-0.0002(-0.185)
-0.0024(-0.940)
-0.0008(-0.482)

Positive AAR(%)
Focus-increasing Diversifying
investments
investments

523
523
51.4
543
50.4
48.5
523
50.4
47.6
51.4
54.2

t-diiTerence
A A R ,„. - AARdl,

43.9
46.3
51.2
53.6
26.8
43.9
51.2
53.6
43.9
31.7
56.0

1.2700
05455
-0.1355
0.1202
2.7352*
1.1532
-0.8030
-0.6730
0.4261
0.7206
0.6115

Comparison of cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) for the Focus-Increasing and Diversifying
Foregin Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms, t-statistics for the Mean Difference of CAARs Between Two
Samples for Several Window Intervals: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in parentheses) •**,**,* denote the
significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.

Trading
Interval

[-5 t o +5]
[-5 to +1]
[-2 to +1]
[•lto + 1 ]
[-1 to 0]
[ 0 to +1]

Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, CAAR (%)
Focus-increasing
Diversifying
investments
investments
(N=105)
(N=41)
0.0105(1.649)*
0.0076(1.637)*
0.0037(1.253)
0.0026(0.754)
0.0010(0.416)
0.0025(1.045)

-0.0106(-1.135)
-0.0084(-0.974)
-0.0071(-1.148)
-0.0034(-1.595)*
-0.0125(-2.882)***
0.0016( 0.397)

t-DIfference
CAAR,^, - CAAR,,,,

2.3166"
2.1679"
1.6041*
1.6901*
2.7345"
0.1840

Notes: (1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with foreign investment as reported in the
Wall Street Journal.
(2) The investment is classified as focus-increasing if the 2-digit SIC code of investment is the
same as firm’s main 2-digit SIC code (i.e. firm’s core business). Otherwise, diversifying
investments.
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This evidence appears to support the view that an increase in corporate focus is
consistent with the market value maximization hypothesis [Comment and Jarrell (1995),
John and Ofek (1995)], whereas diversifying investments tend to decrease the value of
the firm. The negative stock reactions associated with diversifying investment
announcements may be because diversifying investments are one way in which managers
waste cash flows at the expense of shareholders’ wealth [Jensen (1986)]. Another possible
explanation is that firms with poor investment opportunities in their core-business seem
to engage in diversifying foreign investments [Lang and Stulz (1994)].
This result is in contrast with the internalization theory of foreign direct investment
which implies that foreign direct investments is a positive function of firms’ intangible
assets. These results suggest that firms engaging in foreign direct investment either for
the benefits associated with reverse-intemalization or for survival reasons. The relation
between the two-day abnormal returns and the type of investment for value-maximizing
and overinvesting firms is examined below. Table 11-10 provides the two-day cumulative
abnormal returns for foreign investments, classified by Tobin’s q and the type of
investment.

[Insert Table 11-10 about here]

Panel A of Table 11-10 shows that Focus-increasing investments by value-maximizing
firms realize the highest two-day abnormal of 1.52% (t-statistic = 3.739), implying that
focus-increasing investments by firms with profitable investment opportunities create more
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Table 11-10
Comparison of Cumulative Average Abnormal Stock Returns (CARs.)>0, CARs., ,,) for the Foreign
Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms, Classified by Tobin’s q1 and type of investment (focusincreasing vs diversifying),2 Classified by 2-Digit SIC Industry Code: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in
parentheses) ***,**,* denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.

A. CAR(-l.O)

Focus-increasing

q > 1

q< 1
Mean
Difference

0.0152
(3.739)**’
N=32
-0.0048
(-1.926)*
N=73
0.0200
(3384)***

Diversifying

Mean Difference

0.0044
(0.570)
N=9

0.0108
(1307)

•0.0180
(-3.639)***
N=32

0.0132
(2.513)*’

0.0224
(2312)**

B. CAR(-1,+1)

Focus-increasing

q>i

0.0163
(3.089)***
N=32

q < 1

-0.0062
(-1.100)
N=73

Mean
Difference

0.0194
(3.084)***

Diversifying

Mean Difference

0.0073
(0.616)
N=9

0.0090
(0.679)

-0.0127
(-2.184)**
N=32

0.0096
(1.413)

0.0200
(1.499)

1 q > 1 (q < 1) indicates value-maximizing (overinvesting) firms.
J The investment is classified as focus-increasing investment if the 2-digit SIC code of the investment is the same as the
firm ’s main 2-<ligit SIC code (i.e. firm ’s core business), otherwise, it is classified as diversifying investment
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shareholder wealth. On the other hand, diversifying investments by overinvesting firms
experience the lowest two-day abnormal returns of -1.80% (t-statistic = -3.639),
suggesting that diversifying investments by firms with poor investment opportunities
substantially decrease the value of the firm. This evidence may also indicate that firms
with decreasing investment opportunities in their core-business engage in diversifying
investments for survival reasons. However, capital markets appear to penalize these firms
for such investments. Panel B provides evidence based on a broader (-1, +1) window
interval. The findings are consistent with those reported in Panel A.

B2. Pre- and Post-Investment Profitability Performance

In a recent study by John and Ofek (1995), it is reported that firms with focusincreasing asset-sales improve performance, while firms with diversifying asset-sales do
not. Using this sample of foreign investments, this essay investigates the changes in preand post-performance of firms pursuing focus-increasing and diversifying investments. To
compare the mean and median change in profitability of firms with focus-increasing and
firms with diversifying investments around foreign investment announcements, as in Essay
I, three measures o f profitability are used: (1) earnings before interest, taxes, and
depreciation (EBITD) to sales, (2) EBITD to book value of assets, and (3) EBITD to
market value of equity. These ratios represent firm’s efficiency in operations [John and
Ofek (1995)]. To account for industry changes on the firm’s performance, industryadjusted profitability measures are used. The industry-adjusted measures are estimated by
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subtracting from the firm’s change the median changes, over the same period, of all firms
in COMPUSTAT file with the same 2-digit SIC code.
Table 11-11 presents the changes in pre- and post-investment profitability of firms
undertaking focus-increasing and diversifying foreign investments.

[Insert Table 11-11 about here]

In the first two columns o f Table II-11, the mean and median of operating margins
for focus-increasing investments around several window intervals are reported. The results
show that the mean changes in EBITD to sales ratio are 4.80%, 8.81%, and 9.92% from
year zero to year one, two, and three, respectively. This evidence indicates that firms with
an increase in focus improve their performance after investment year. On the other hand,
the third column which reports performance of firms with diversifying investments shows
that the mean changes in EBITD to sales ratio are -2.37%, -5.29%, and -7.33% from year
zero to year one, two, and three, respectively. This result suggests that performance for
firms with diversifying investments appears to be deteriorating. The other two profitability
measures - changes in EBITD to assets (ROA) and changes in EBITD to market value
of equity - show similar results.
This evidence is consistent with the findings reported in Essay I for domestic
investments. These results are also consistent with John Ofek’s (1995) findings, for firms
with focus-increasing divestitures, which show that the mean changes in EBITD to sales
ratio are 0.7%, 1.3%, and 2.3% from year zero to year one, two, and three, respectively.
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Table 11-11

Industry-Adjusted Profitability Changes Around the Focus-increasing and Diversifying Foreign Investment
Announcements by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992. ***, **, • denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level.
Diversifying
Investments
Mean Median

Focus-Increasing
Investments
Mean
Median1

Difference between Samples
Mean

Median

A. Change in operating margin (EBHD/Sales)2
year -2 to -1

0.0180

0.0049

-0.0142

-0.0042

0.0322

0.0051

year -1 to 0

0.0024

0.0000

-0.0020

0.0098

0.0044

-0.0098

year 0 to +1

0.0480

0.0120

-0.0237

-0.0023

0.0717*

0.0143

year 0 to +2

0.0881*

0.0240

-0.0529

-0.0251

0.1410"

0.0943*

year 0 to +3

0.0992*

0.0267

-0.0733*

-0.0752*

0.1725"

0.1019*'

B. Change in returns on assets (ROA)3
year -2 to -1

0.0110

0.0107

-0.0247

-0.0081

0.0357

0.0188

year -1 to 0

0.0117

0.0000

-0.0112

-0.0350

0.0229

0.0350

year 0 to +1

0.0192

0.0042

-0.0551

-0.0410

0.0743

0.0452

year 0 to +2

0.0914*

0.0104

-0.0746

•0.0288

0.1660"

0.0392

year 0 to +3

0.0950*

0.0308

-0.0935*

-0.0177

0.1885"

0.0485

C. Change in EBITD/market value of euqity4
year -2 to -1

0.0363

0.0184

0.0187

0.0001

0.0309

0.0184

year -1 to 0

0.0313

0.0309

0.0284

0.0258

0.0029

0.0051

year 0 to +1

0.0327

0.0208

-0.0544

•0.0007

0.0871*

0.0215

year 0 to +2

0.1154**

0.0256

-0.0697

-0.0230

0.1851”

0.0486

year 0 to +3

0.1514*’

0.1112"

-0.0817*

-0.0206

0.2310*"

0.1318’

1 Median singiflcance tests are based on the Wilcoxon signed rank te s t
2 The difference between the change in operating margin from year to year and the median change in the industry. The
operating margins is defined as the ratio of EBITD (eamings before interest, taxes, and depreciation) to sales.
2 The difference between the change in return on assets from year to year and the median change in the industry. The
return on assets is defined as the ratio of EBITD/book value of total assets.
4 The difference between the change in EBITD/market value of equity from year to year and the median change in industry.
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For firms with diversifying divestitures, the mean changes in EBITD to sales ratios are 1.7%, 2.9%, and -3.0% from year zero to year one, two, and three, respectively. The
evidence in Table II-11 supports the view that, when firms attempt to invest outside their
core-business in an effort to enhance their investment opportunities, their performance is
not likely to improve as suggested by Lang and Stulz (1994).

B3. The Relation Between Change in Performance and Change in Focus

This section examines the cross-sectional relation between change in performance of
investing firms and change in corporate focus. As in Essay I, the same three focus
measures are used. The first focus measure is used to examine whether or not the
investment is related to the firm’s primary business. If the 2-digit SIC code of the new
investment is the same as the firm’s main 2-digit business, the investment is classified as
a focus-increasing investment. Otherwise, it is classified as diversifying investment.40
The second measure of focus employed is the number of lines o f business segments in
which the firms engage. The increase in the number of business segments indicates that
firms increase the degree of corporate diversification. The third measure of focus is the
sales-based Herfindahl index which is calculated as the sum o f the squares of each
segment’s sales as a proportion of total sales. The closer the Herfindahl index is to 1, the
more concentrated are the firm’s sales within a few of its business segments and, hence,
the more focused its operations.

40 See Lang and Stulz (1994) and Comment and Jarrell (1995) for detailed description o f focus
measures.
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Table 11-12 reports the relation between in changes in profitability from year zero to
year two and the change in corporate focus measures.

[Insert Table 11-12 about here]

The first regression shows that the firm’s profit margin is positively related to the
focus dummy, implying that focus-increasing investments enhance firm’s profit margin.
Similar results are obtained when the other two alternative focus measures - number of
segments and Herfindahl index - are used. The results also indicate that, when the number
of business segments increases, the performance of the firm deteriorates. Similarly,
increases in the Herfindahl index tend to improve corporate profitability performance. The
two other profitability measures (i.e., EBITD to assets and EBITD to market value of
equity) yield similar results.41 This evidence implies that foreign investments which
increase firm’s corporate focus tend to improve its performance two years after the
investment, whereas investments which do not increase the firm’s focus appear to worsen
its performance. Although in the context of domestic divestitures, John and Ofek (1995)
provide a positive relation between changes in firm’s profitability and increase in
corporate focus. This clearly suggests that corporate focus improves corporate
performance regardless of how is achieved.

41 The post-profitability results for a broader window interval (i.e., from year zero to year three) remain
essentially similar to those presented in Table 11-12. When indicator variables are used to capture the
change in the number o f business segments and the Herfindahl index, the results remain unchanged.
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Table IM 2
The Relation Between the Change in Post-Performance of Investing Firms and the Change in Focus around the Foreign Investment
Announcements by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992. (t-statistics are in parentheses) ***,**,* denote the significance at the 1%. 5%, 10% level.
Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted change In EBITD/iales from year 0 to year 2‘

regl
-0.1658(-2300)“

inlerccpt
focus dummy3

4

reg2
0.1542(2.938)"

-0.1098(-1.986)“

0.2129(2.499)"
-0.0404(-3.098)*“

change in the number of segments’
change In the Herfindahl index*
R’ <%)

reg3

0.2477(2.470)*"
4.65

7.83

233

Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted change in EBITD/assets from year 0 to year 2’

regl
intercept
focus dummy

-0.2370(-2.423)"

reg2
0.2284(1399)

-03059<-1.568)

0.2496(2.158)"
-0.0571(-2.016)"

change in the number of segments
change In the Herfindahl index
R‘ (%)

reg3

0.4312(2371)"
3.51

3.15

434

Dependent variable: Industry-adjusted change In EBITD/market value of equity from year 0 to year 2*

regl
intercept
focus dummy

-0.1 U3(.1.450)

reg2
0.1979(1.004)

-ai437(-1348)

0.1796(1.978)"

change in the number of segments

-0.0496(-2336)"

change in the Herfindahl Index
R’ (%)

reg3

0.2914(1.974)"
2.96

3.85

3.05

1 The difference between the change in the investing firm’s EBITD/saies from year 0 to year 2 and the median change in
the industry.

2Focus dummy is 1 if the 2-digit SIC code of investment is the same as the firm ’s main 2-digit SIC code (i.e. firm ’s core
business), and 0 otherwise.
3 The change in the num ber of segments from year -1 to 0.
4 Change in the Herfindahl index from years -1 to 0. The Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of segments’ sales
squared, divided by total sales squared.
3 The difference between the change in the investing firm’s EBITD/assets from year 0 to year 2 and the median change in
the industry.
4 The difference between the change in the investing firm’s EBITD/market value of equity from year 0 to year 2 and the
median change in the industry.
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B4. The Relation Between Two-Day Stock Market Returns and Change in Focus

While Table 11-12 examines the relation between firm’s performance, using
accounting profitability measures, and the changes in corporate focus, Table 11-13
analyzes the relation between the two-day abnormal returns and the changes in corporate
focus. The two-day abnormal returns are used as market’s immediate assessment of the
firm’s profitability in response to its foreign investment announcements.

[Insert Table 11-13 about here]

The first regression shows that the two-day abnormal returns are positively related to
the focus dummy, implying that focus-increasing investments produce 1.32% higher
returns than diversifying investments. In the second regression, the change in the number
of business segments variable is inversely related to the two-day abnormal returns. It
»

implies that focus-increasing investments are value-increasing while diversifying
investments tend to destroy shareholder value. The third regression reports a positive
relation between the change in Herfindahl index and the two-day abnormal returns. This
evidence indicates that the abnormal returns for foreign investments are higher when
firm’s Herfindahl index increases.42

42 Using dummy variables for change in the number o f business segment and the change in Herfindahl
index, the relation between two-day abnormal returns and dummy variables for focus measures is
examined. It yields similar results as Table 11-13.
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Table 11-13
The Relation Between the Investing Firm’s Two-Day Cumulative Abnormal
Returns (CAR.,0) and the Change in Focus around the Foreign Investment
Announcements by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992. (t-statistics are in parentheses) ***,♦*,*
denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.

Dependent variable: 2-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns

observation
intercept
focus dummy1

regl

reg2

reg3

145

143

142

0.0052
(1.068)

-0.0055
(-1.026)

-0.0120
(-2.948)***
0.0132
(2.759)***

change in the
number of segments2

-0.0024
(-1.872)*

change in the
Herfindahl index3
R2 (%)

0.0042
(1.974)**
4.96

2.42

0.18

1 F ocus dum m y is 1 if the 2-digit S IC code o f investm ent is th e sam e as th e firm ’s m ain 2-digit
S IC code (i.e. firm ’s core business), an d 0 otherw ise.
2 T h e change in th e n u m b e r o f segm ents fro m y e a r -1 to 0.
3 C han g e in the H erfindahl index fro m y ears -1 to 0. T h e H erfin d ah l index is calcu lated as th e
su m o f segm ents’ sales sq u a re d , divided by to ta l sales sq u a re d .
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C. Comparison of the Valuation Effects Between Domestic and Foreign Investments

Expansion into foreign markets involves a set of risks and costs that firms do not
incur with domestic expansion, including risks of changes in exchange rates and exchange
controls and the complications of both foreign taxation and domestic taxation of foreign
income. To evaluate foreign investments, firms may compare anticipated rates of return
on a foreign investment with those on a comparable domestic investment. It is argued that
firms are likely to invest abroad only when the anticipated rate of returns on the foreign
investments exceed that on domestic investments [Fatemi (1984)].
Panel A o f Table 11-14 presents the daily abnormal returns for both samples of
domestic and foreign investment announcements.

[Insert Table 11-14 about here]

The results show that differences between domestic and foreign investments around
the announcement day and several broader window intervals are not significant at any
level of significance with the exception of -5 to + 5 and -5 to +1 trading intervals. These
results seem to suggest small differences in abnormal returns between domestic and
foreign investments in favor of the latter. This may be attributed to the fact that low q
firms represent 73% of the entire sample o f firms investing abroad while a smaller
fraction of firms (68%) investing at home. This evidence is consistent with findings
reported by Finnerty, Owers, and Rogers (1986) which point out that there is little
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Table 11-14
A. Daily Average Abnormal Returns (AARs), % of Positive AARs for the Entire Samples of Both Domestic
and Foreign Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms, t-statistics for the Daily Mean Differences of AARs
Between Two Samples for the Event Period -5 to +5 Trading Days: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in
parentheses) ***,**,• denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Average Abnormal Returns, AAR,(%)
Domestic
Foreign
(N=194)
(N=156)

Day

-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
+i
+2
+3
44
+5

-0.0025(-2jl3)“
0.0009( 0.453)
-0.0003(-0.160)
0.0010( 0.755)
-0.0037(-2330f
-0.0023(-0.868)
-0.0023(-1377)*
-0.0000( 0.277)
0.0008( 1.057)
0.0022( 2.134)“
-0.0020(-1.095)

0.0009( 0.643)
0.0011( 0.762)
0.0018 (0.891)
0.0010( 1.104)
-0.0023(-1.749)*
-0.0020(-0.798)
0.0014( 0.655)
-0.0007(-0.549)
0.0010( 0.237)
0.0013( 0.689)
0.0007( 0.232)

Positive AAR(%)
Domestic
Foreign

43.8
49.5
48.4
49.5
37.6
42.8
49.5
51.5
48.4
54.1
44.8

t-difTerence
AARdom - AARfor
-1.725*
-0.049
-0.990
0.024
-0.636
•0.148
-1.607'
0344
-0.012
0354
-1.274

51J
52.6
50.6
53.8
44.2
46.2
50.0
50.0
45.5
45.5
55.1

B. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) for the Entire Sample of Both Domestic and Foreign
Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms, t-statistics for the Mean Difference of CAARs Between Two
Samples for Several Window Intervals: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in parentheses) *•*,**,* denote the
significance at the 1%, 5% , 10% level.

Trading
Interval

Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, CAAR (%)
Domestic
Foreign
(N=194)
(N=156)

[-5
[-5
[-2
[-1
[-1
[0

-0.0080(-1.050)
-0.0091(-2.219)'*
-0.0073(-1.920)"
-0.0083(-2.656)***
-0.0060(-2.273)**
0.0046( 1.596)

to
to
to
to
to
to

+5]
+1]
+1]
+1]
0]
+1]

0.0038( 0.623)
0.0018( 0.551)
-0.0020(-0394)
-0.0029(-1.092)
-0.0042(-1.810)*
-0.0005(-0.101)

t-Difference
C A A R ^ - CAAR,m

-1.915*'
-2.112“
-1.261
-1.482
-0.565
-1303

Notes: Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with investments as reported in the Wall Street
Journal.

i
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difference in abnormal returns between domestic and international joint ventures. One
possible explanation is that, as Shapiro (1986) suggests, foreign investment may be
undertaken for reasons of survival rather than for abnormal returns. Saturated domestic
markets may force firms to expand abroad just to maintain growth rather than to earn
higher abnormal returns than domestic investments.
To examine whether differences in abnormal returns between domestic and foreign
investments are due to the overrepresentation of value-maximizing firms in the domestic
sample, abnormal returns are estimated for value-maximizing and overinvesting firms.
Panel A of Table 11-15 presents the cumulative abnormal returns for several trading
intervals for domestic and foreign investments based on the q characteristics of the firms
in the two samples.

[Insert Table 11-15 about here]

During the trading period of -5 to +5, both domestic and foreign investments realize
positive abnormal returns. However, the gain differences between the two samples are not
significant at any level of significance. Panel B of Table 15 provides cumulative abnormal
returns between domestic and foreign investments by overinvesting firms. Even though
domestic investments experience more negative abnormal returns than

foreign

investments, the loss differences between the two samples are not significant at any
conventional level of significance with the exception of -5 to +5 and -5 and +1 trading
intervals.
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Table IMS
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs), Classified by Tobin’s q, for Both Domestic and Foreign
Investment Announcements by U.S. Firms, t-statistics for the Mean Difference of CAARs Between Two Samples
for Several Window Intervals: 1980-1992. (t-statistics are in parentheses) ***,**,* denote the significance at the
1% ,5% , 10% level.
A. q > 1
Trading
Interval

[-5 to
[-5 to
[-2 to
[-1 to
[-1 to
[ 0 to

+5]
+11
+1]
+1]
0]
+1]

Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, CAAR (%)
Domestic
Foreign
(N=61)
(N=42)
0.0107(1.482)
0.0060(0.692)
0.0086(2.036)’*
0.0059(2.273)"
0.0083(3.160)"*
0.0013(1.109)

0.0284(2.793)"
0.0196(2.707)"
0.0140(2.576)"
0.0138(2.947)*"
0.0128(3.558)*"
0.0068(1.992)"

t-DifTerence
CAAR*,. - CAAR,,

-1.452
-1.414
-0.747
-1.402
-0.843
-1.228

B. q < 1
Trading
•iiterval

[-5
[-5
[-2
[-1
[-1
[0

to
to
to
to
to
to

+5]
+1]
+1]
+1]
0]
+1]

Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, CAAR (%)
Domestic
Foreign
(N=133)
(N=114)
-0.0166(-2.260)**
-0.0159(-3.130)*“
-0.0146(-3.677)*“
-0.0148(-4.719)*~
-0.0126(-4.859)*~
-0.0074(-2.663)**

-0.0049(-0.935)
-0.0045(-0.998)
-0.0078(-2.025)~
-0.0091(-3.067)*~
-0.0106(-4.267)*"
-0.0033(-1327)

t-DifTerence
CAAR*,, - O

-1.698*
-1.898"
-1361
-1324
-0.603
-1.040

Notes: (1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with investments as reported in the Wall Street
Journal.
(2) If the value of Tobin’s q is greater (less) than 1, firm is classified into value-maximizing
(overinvesting) firm.
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The results seem to suggest that domestic and foreign investments by valuemaximizing firms enhance shareholder wealth, whereas investments by overinvesting
firms tend to reduce the value of the firm.43
In addition, the cross-sectional relation between the two-day abnormal returns and the
location of investments (i.e., domestic and foreign) by value-maximizing and
overinvesting firms, and the type of investment (i.e, focus-increasing and diversifying) by
value-maximizing and overinvesting firms is analyzed. In the first regression, the
foreign/high q dummy variable is equal to one when a foreign investment is made by
value-maximizing firm, and zero otherwise. Also, the foreign/low q dummy variable is
equal to one when a foreign investment is made by an overinvesting firm, and zero
otherwise. The U.S./high q dummy variable is equal to one if an investment is domestic
investment by a value-maximizing firm, and zero otherwise. In the second regression, the
foreign/focus dummy is equal to one if a focus-increasing foreign investment is
undertaken, and zero otherwise. The foreign/div dummy is equal to one if a diversifying
foreign investment is undertaken, and zero otherwise. The U.S./focus dummy is equal to
one if a focus-increasing domestic investment is undertaken, and zero otherwise.
Table 11-16 reports the cross-sectional regression results between the two-day
abnormal returns on Tobin’s q ans the set of dummy variables described earlier for the
entire samples of domestic and foreign investment announcements.

[Insert Table 11-16 about here]

43 This study also conduct the same tests, using control sam ple in which firms have both domestic and
foreign plant announcements. The results are similar to findings reported in Table 11-14.
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Table 11-16
Cross-sectional Regressions of the Two-Day Announcement Period Abnormal
Returns on the Tobin’s q, Domestic/Foreign Investment, and Focus dummy for the
Entire Domestic and Foreign Investment Announcements During the Period of 19801992. (t-statistics are in parentheses) ***,**,* denote the significance at the 1%, 5%,
10% level.

variables

regl
(N=350)

intercept

-0.0125(-6.052)*“

foreign/high q dummy1

0.0281( 6.882)*”

foreign/low q dummy
U.S/high q dummy

reg2
(N=333)
-0.0083(-3.323)” *

-0.0001(-0.045)
0.0208( 5.646)*”

foreign/focus dummy2

0.0113( 2.892)*”

foreign/div dummy

-0.0008(-0.212)

U.S j Tocus dummy

0.0049( 1.336)

R2

18.33

3.27

1 foreign/high q = 1 if firm has foreign investm ent a n d h ig h q.
0 otherw ise.
foreign/low q = if firm has foreign investm ent a n d low q .
0 otherw ise.
U .S ih ig h q
= 1 if firm has dom estic investm ent a n d h ig h q.
0 otherw ise.
T hus, in tercep t indicates dom estic investm ent/low q A rm .
2 foreign/focus is 1 if firm has foreign a n d focus-increasing investm ent.
0 otherw ise.
foreign/div is 1 if firm has foreign a n d diversifying in v e stm e n t
0 otherw ise.
U.S^focus
is 1 if firm has dom estic a n d focus-increasing in v e stm e n t
T hus, in tercep t indicates dom estic/diversifying in v e stm e n t
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The first regression shows that, the two-day abnormal returns are positively related
to both foreign/high q and U.S./high q dummy variables at the 1% level. On the other
hand, the two-day abnormal returns are negatively related to both foreign/low q and
U.S./low q dummy variables. These results show cleariy that shareholders’ wealth is
positively related to the firm’s investment opportunities.
The second regression provides results on the relationship between the two-day
abnormal returns and the focus dummy variables. This relationship appears to be positive
and consistent with previously reported results which established the importance of focusincreasing investments as a necessity for raising the market value o f the firm.

D. V aluation Effects of C orporate M ultinationalism

The multinational network hypothesis argues that firms create shareholder wealth by
entering into a new geographic market rather existing markets. Previous studies regarding
foreign investments provide evidence that the valuation effects o f foreign expansion
depend on firm’s international exposure in a target firm’s country [Doukas and Travlos
(1988), Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991)].44 In this study, the impact of corporate
multinationalism on the value of the firm is examined using the sample of foreign plant
investments.
Panel A of Table 11-17 shows the daily abnormal returns for firms already operating

44 Doukas and Travlos (1988) classified firms into three groups, a) operating in target firm’s country,
b) not operating in target firm 's country, c) going abroad for the first time. But in this paper, the first
two (a and b) cases are examined since their third sample size was to small to draw inferences.
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in a target country, and firms not operating in a target country.

[Insert Table II-17 about here]

At the announcement day (day 0), firms already operating in a target country produce
significant negative abnormal returns o f -0.64% (t-statistic = -3.399), while firms entering
into new geographic areas earn significant positive returns of 0.59% (t-statistic = 3.051).
The mean differences between two subsamples are significant at the 1% level, indicating
that firms investing abroad for the first time benefit the most. In Panel B of Table 11-17,
firms already having operations in a target country experience significant negative twoday abnormal returns of -1.17% (t-statistic = -1.808), while firms with no previous
operations gain significant positive two-day abnormal returns o f 1.05% (t-statistic =
1.801). The mean differences between two samples are significant at the 1% level.
The results reported in Table 11-17 appear to be consistent with the predictions of the
multinational network hypothesis in the sense that firm value increases when its existing
multinational network expands through foreign investments. On the other hand, foreign
investments which do not expand the multinational network of the firm fail to raise the
market value of the firm. This evidence is consistent with Doukas and Travlos’s (1988)
findings which show that U.S. firms not operating in the target firm’s country gain
positive abnormal returns of 0.31%, while U.S. firms already operating in the target firm’s
country produce negative abnormal returns o f -0.08% around the foreign acquisition
announcements.
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Table 11-17

A. Dally Average Abnormal Returns (AARs), % of Positive AARs for the Foreign Investment Announcements
by U.S. Firm s Already Having Plants in the Target Country and U.S. Firms Not Having Plants in the
Target Country, t-statistics for the Daily Mean Differences of AARs Between Two Samples for the Event
Period -5 to +5 Trading Days: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in parentheses) •**,**,* denote the significance
at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Average Abnormal Returns, AAR,(%)
Presence
No Presence
(N=49)
(N=98)

Day

-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5

0.0022( 1.490)
0.0024( 1.436)
0.0023( 1.104)
0.0013( 0.908)
■0.0054(-3.025)*~
-0.0064(-3J99)
0.0026( 1.470)’
-0.0013(-0.818)
-0.0009(-0.465)
0.0015( 0.117)
•0.003K 0.136)

Presence

-0.003K-1J9S)’
-0.0007(-0.264)
0.0003( 0.491)
•0.0016( 0.052)
0.0046( 1.754)’
0.0059( 3.051)’"
-0.0020(-0.992)
-0.0005(-0.207)
0.0037( 0.941)
0.0002(-0.637)
-0.0026(-l.186)

Positive AAR(%)
No Presence

t-dlfferer

AARpr^nCT *
57.1
52.0
51.0
54.0
36.7
36.7
53.0
50.0
45.9
46.9
57.1

38.7
55.1
48.9
55.1
59.1
59.1
44.8
48.9
44.8.
38.7
48.7

1.628’
1.170
0.495
0.699
-2.730’"
-3.323’“
1.298
-0.270
-1.403
0.279
1.639

B. Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) for the Foreign Investment Announcements by U.S.
Firms Already Having Plants and Firms Not Having Plants in the Target Country, t-statistics for the Mean
Difference of CAARs Between Two Samples for Several Window Intervals: 1980-1992 (t-statistics are in
parentheses) *•*,**,* denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
Trading
Interval

Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns, CAAR (%)
t-Difference
Presence
No Presence
CAARppj,, - CAARpp
(N=98)
(N=49)

[-5
[-5
[-2
[-1
[-1
[0

0.0015( 0.451)
-0.0009(-0.074)
-0.0079(-0.800)
-0.0091(-1.122)
-0.0117(-1.808)”
-0.003K-0.538)

to
to
to
to
to
to

+5]
+1]
+1]
+1]
0]
-4-1]

0.0042(0.067)
0.0034(0.357)
0.0069(0.995)
0.0085(1.133)
0.0105(1.801)"
0.0039(0.819)

-0.267
-0.530
-2.416*"
-3.098’"
-4.420’"
-1.519

Notes: (1) Day 0 is the first announcement date associated with foreign investment as reported in the Wall
Street Journal.
(2) The presence of plants in the target firms was referred to the Directory of Multinationals and the
Moody’s Industrial Manual. The 9 observations ir excluded since they are ambiguous to determine
the foreign exposure.
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E. Cross-Sectional Analysis

Finally, Table 11-18 presents cross-sectional regression results of the two-day
abnormal returns on a set o f variables accounting for other potential factors such as the
firm’s characteristics, size of investment, and taxes among others.

[Insert Table 11-18 about here]

The first regression shows the relation between the two-day abnormal returns and a
set o f dummy variables for the type of investment and the firm’s investment opportunities.
Value-maximizing firms (i.e., high q) with focus-increasing investments realize significant
positive abnormal returns (t-statistic = 3.998), while overinvesting firms (i.e., low q)
engaging in diversifying investments experience significant negative abnormal returns (tstatistic = -2.576). This evidence shows that focus-increasing investments tend to increase
shareholder wealth, while diversifying investments do not.
In the second regression, the negative relation between the level of free cash flows
and the two-day abnormal stock returns indicates that agency costs between managers and
shareholders increase as free cash flows rise, supporting the prediction of the
overinvestment hypothesis.
The impact o f the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on the value of the firm is also examined
in the third regression. The change in interest allocation rules introduced by the Tax
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Table 11-18
Cross-sectional Regressions of the Two-day Announcement Period Abnormal
Returns (CAR.,4) on the Firm and Investment Characteristics for Foreign
Investments by U.S. Firms: 1980-1992. (t-statistics are in parentheses) ♦**,**,*
denote the significance at 1%, 5 % , 10% level.

variable
intercept

reg I
(N=147)
-0.0017
(-0.329)

reg 2
(N=156)
0.0048
(0.812)

reg 3
(N=156)
-0.0048
(-1.520)

reg4
(N=83)
-0.0032
(-0.161)

high q/focus1

0.0247
(3.998)” *

0.0291
(2.966)*”

high q/div1

0.0046
(0.509)

0.0036
(0.340)

low q/div3

•0.0009
(-2.576)*”

-0.0034"
(-1.945)

free cash
flow
Tax4

•0.0671
(-1.671)*

-0.0607
(-0.925)
0.0271
(0.763)

•

-0.0014
(-0.239)

size of
investment

0.0000
(0.007)

log(asset)

0.0029
(0.640)

debt/assets

0.0025
(0.104)

ownership’

0.0001
(0.323)

foreign sales/
total sales

0.0000
(0.059)

log(firm size)

-0.0039
(-0.710)

RJ (%)

12.21

1.78

0.03

16.52

1 high q/focus is 1 if a firm is value-maximizing with focus-increasing investments, and 0
otherwise.
,,
1 high q/div is 1 if value-maximizing with diversifying investment, and 0 otherwise.
3 low q/div is 1 if overinvesting firms with diversifying investments, and 0 otherwise.
4 Tax is 1 if investments are announced after 1986 Tax Reform, and 0 otherwise.
5 It is defined as percent of outstanding shares held by insiders.
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Reform Act of 1986 reduced tax deductibility of the U.S. interest expense.45
Accordingly, the Tax Reform Act might have increased the firm’s cost of capital and thus
decrease foreign investment activities. The evidence in the third regression shows that
changes in the Tax Reform Act in 1986 did not have any influence on the value of the
firm around the two-day investment announcement period.
The fourth regression examines whether the two-day abnormal returns for corporate
investments are related to several other firm characteristics. It is argued that, as firm’s
debt increases, managers are more closely monitored by creditors and have less cash
flows to undertake sub-optimal or value-decreasing investments [Jensen (1986)]. This
argument implies a positive relation between the stock market returns and firm’s debt
ratios. Also, if managers have a large stake in the firms they manage, they are less likely
to invest in negative NPV projects, predicting a positive relation between the two-day
abnormal returns and the fractions of shares held by managers [Lewellen, Loderer, and
Rosenfeld (1985)].46 In addition, there is the argument that, since large firms have more
resources, larger internal capital markets, and economies of scale, firm size may be
relevant in explaining the abnormal returns associated with new investments. Hence, the
coefficient of the firm size variable is expected to be positive. Even though the firm’s
debt ratio, the fraction of ownership held by managers, and the firm size variables have

45 The U.S. government have sought to limit how much interest expense multinational firms can deduct
from their U.S. income. It is because U.S. multinational firms can borrow money in one country and
deploy the funds elsewhere. The loss o f tax deductibility o f interest expense might lead multinational
firms to borrow and invest less, and scale back the scope o f their foreign operations.
44 Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld (1985) show that bidder returns increase with the faction o f bidder
equity held by managers.
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coefficients with predicted signs, none of the coefficients appear to be significant at any
level.
Furthermore, it is argued that, since firms involved in international business have
expertise in foreign investments, firm’s prior international exposure is expected to be
positively related to the stock market returns. Ratio of foreign sales to total sales, used
as proxy for firm’s international involvement, is shown to be positively but not
significantly related to the abnormal returns. Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991) also report an
insignificant relation between the ratio of foreign sales to total sales and the stock market
returns for international joint ventures. In addition, the evidence shown in Table 18
suggests that size of investment and firm size have little explanatory power. Overall, the
evidence shows that firm with investment opportunities (i.e., value-maximizing) that
undertake focus-increasing investments experience substantial abnormal returns.

VII. Concluding Remarks

This study examines the effects of corporate investment decisions on the value of the
firm, using a sample of foreign plant announcements by U.S. firms during the period of
1980-1992. In this paper, two possible explanations associated with the valuation effects
of foreign investments are addressed: (1) firm’s investment opportunities and (2) type of
investment (i.e., focus-increasing and diversifying). In addition, the overinvestment
hypothesis [Jensen (1986), Doukas (1995)] which implies that the impact of foreign
investments on the value o f the firm depends on the firm’s investment opportunities and
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the agency costs associated with the managerial discretion ol corporate cash flows is
investigated.
The evidence presented in this study is consistent with the predictions of the
overinvestment hypothesis. That is, value-maximizing firms realize positive stock returns
from foreign investment announcements, whereas overinvesting firms suffer losses.
Furthermore, the relation between the two-day abnormal returns and the level o f free cash
flows is significantly negative, indicating that agency costs increase with the level of free
cash flows as predicted by the overinvestment hypothesis.
The evidence on the effects of the type o f investment on the value of the firm shows
that focus-increasing investments increase shareholder wealth, while diversifying
investments do not. That is, an increase in corporate focus is consistent with shareholder
wealth maximization [John and Ofek (1995)]. In addition, pre- and post-performance tests
provide evidence which shows that focus-increasing investments tend to improve
corporate performance, while diversifying investments do not. This evidence appears to
support the view [Lang and Stulz (1994)] that diversifying investments are not valueincreasing. That is, firms might increase shareholder wealth by investing on the business
in which they may have competitive edge.
Further, comparison between domestic and foreign investments indicates no
significant differences in abnormal returns between the two samples. This evidence
indicates that poorly managed firms go abroad for survival reasons [Shapiro (1986)]. This
study also presents evidence which shows that when firms enter into a new geographic
market create shareholder wealth, implying that they enhance their ability to arbitrage
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cross-country differences by expanding the firm’s network. Focus-expansion, however,
appears to yield the highest gain for the shareholders of the expanding firms.
Cross-sectional analysis shows that the firm’s investment opportunities and
investments that strengthen its corporate focus are yielding the higheest returns. However,
other control variables such as size of investment, fraction of shares held by managers,
ratio o f foreign sales to total sales, and firm size are found to have little explanatory
power.
Consistent with the findings reported in Essay I, this study provides evidence which
shows that well-mananged firms with growth opportunities increase shareholder wealth
when they undertake focus-increasing foreign investments primarily in geographical
regions without previous operating exposure.
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